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Abstrat
How muh of arry trade exess returns an be explained by the presene of disaster risk?
To answer this question, we propose a simple strutural model that inludes both Gaussian and
disaster risk premia and an be estimated even in samples that do not ontain disasters. The
model points to a novel estimation proedure based on urreny options with potentially dierent
strikes. We implement this proedure on a large set of ountries over the 1996{2008 period,
forming portfolios of hedged and unhedged arry trade exess returns by sorting urrenies based
on their forward disounts. We nd that disaster risk premia aount for about 25% of arry
trade exess returns in advaned ountries.
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1 Introdution
Curreny arry trades oer large expeted exess returns, hallenging the benhmark models in
international maroeonomis. In this paper, we explore whether a lass of disaster-based models
that postulate the existene of rare but large adverse aggregate shoks to stohasti disount fators
an explain these exess returns. This lass of models, pioneered by Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006),
has reeived muh attention reently in the maroeonomis and nane literature. However, this
lass of models is diÆult to estimate beause of the small number of disasters in sample. To
address this diÆulty, we provide a new method for estimating disaster risk premia even in samples
that do not ontain any disasters. We nd that disaster risk premia are statistially signiant and
aount for about one fourth of arry trade exess returns.
Curreny arry trades are investment strategies where one borrows in low{interest rate urren-
ies and invests in high{interest rate urrenies. The value of the exhange rate at the end of the
investment period is the sole soure of risk. If investment urrenies depreiate or funding ur-
renies appreiate, then investors' returns derease beause they lose on their investment or must
reimburse larger amounts. With risk-neutral and rational investors, high{interest rate urrenies
should depreiate on average against low{interest rate urrenies and arry trade exess returns
should be zero. Yet, in the data, these exess returns are large and positive on average. A natural
explanation is that investors are risk averse and demand to be ompensated for taking on suh risk.
Carry trade investors, however, an use urreny options to hedge this urreny risk. For
example, a domesti investor who is long in the foreign urreny may buy a put ontrat that
oers a large payo in ase the foreign urreny depreiates. The investor thereby protets himself
against adverse movements in the exhange rate. Likewise, a domesti investor who is short in the
foreign urreny may buy a all ontrat, proteting herself against an appreiation of the foreign
urreny. Using dierent urreny option ontrats, investors an tailor their exposure to exhange
rate risk, buying protetion against adverse exhange rate movements beyond any hosen uto.
Intuitively, dierent hedged investment strategies should oer returns that are ommensurate with
their levels of risk. For example, the dierene in returns between a strategy that is immune to
large adverse hanges in exhange rates and one that is not immune reets the ompensation for
bearing the risk of a large urreny depreiation. Yet a simple omparison aross unhedged and
hedged returns does not allow a preise estimation of disaster risk premia. The simple reason is
that hedged strategies protet investors against large exhange rate hanges of two types: those
due to jumplike disasters and those that might oasionally happen without any jump in a world of
Gaussian shoks.
In this paper, we propose a parsimonious exhange rate model to disentangle disaster from
Gaussian risk premia. Following Bakus, Foresi and Telmer (2001), we start o with the law of
2
motion of the stohasti disount fator (SDF) in eah ountry. These SDFs inorporate both a
traditional log-normal omponent, as in Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan (2008), and a disaster
omponent, as in Farhi and Gabaix (2008). We assume that nanial markets are omplete and
thus dene the hange in exhange rate as the log dierene between the domesti and foreign
SDFs. In our model, expeted urreny exess returns are simply the sum of Gaussian and disaster
risk premia. The former arise from random shoks observed every period, while the latter are due
to rare disasters. We assume that these disasters do not our in sample. As a onsequene,
hanges in exhange rates follow a normal distribution in sample. Our model delivers losed-form
solutions for short-dated put and all urreny options, hedged urreny exess returns, and risk
reversals (traded option pairs that repliate a long out-of-the-money put position and a short out-
of-the-money all position).
1
We use these expressions to establish a simple empirial proedure
to measure the ompensation for disaster risk. The deomposition of risk premia presented in this
paper is a methodologial ontribution that ould be useful in other asset markets.
We turn to urreny data to implement our proedure and test the model's impliations. To
do so, we rely on urreny spot, forward, and option ontrats olleted by JP Morgan for 32
ountries. The data start in January 1996 and end in Deember 2008. Based on exhange rate
normality tests, we restrit our sample in two dimensions: we fous on advaned ountries and we
exlude the fall of 2008. We take the view that the fall of 2008 orresponds to a unique disaster
in our sample period, and we devote a nal setion to it. As a robustness hek, we report in a
separate appendix the results obtained with both advaned and emerging ountries. Our data set
omprises the pries of one-month options on bilateral exhange rates with dierent degrees of
moneyness: far out-of-the-money puts (denoted 10 delta puts), out-of-the money puts (denoted
25 delta puts), at-the-money puts and alls, out-of-the-money alls (denoted 25 delta alls) and
far out-of-the-money alls (denoted 10 delta alls).
2
Following Lustig and Verdelhan (2007), we form portfolios of urreny exess returns by sorting
urrenies based on their interest rates. We onsider zero-investment strategies that go long in
the highest{interest rate urrenies and short in the lowest{interest rate urrenies. We apply this
methodology to both hedged and unhedged exess returns. Unhedged arry trades yield an average
annual exess return of 6:5% in our sample. Carry trades hedged at 10 delta and 25 delta yield
1
An option is said to be at-the-money if its strike prie is equal to the forward exhange rate. A put (all) option is
said to be out-of-the-money if its strike prie is below (above) the forward rate|that is, if it takes a large depreiation
(appreiation) to make the option worthwhile exerising. Figure 1 presents the payos of three option-based strategies
onsidered throughout this paper: (i) being long an out-of-the-money put option, (ii) being long an out-of-the-money
all option and (iii) being long a risk-reversal (i.e., being long an out-of-the-money put option and short an out-of-the-
money all option with symmetri strikes.)
2
The delta of an option represents its sensitivity to hanges in the spot exhange rate. The delta of a put varies
between 0 for extremely out-of-the-money options to  1 for extremely in-the-money-options. A 10 delta (25 delta)
put is an option with a delta of 10% (25%). Figure 2 presents the deltas of put options as a funtion of their pries.
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4:8% and 3:7% per annum, respetively, while arry trades hedged at the money yield 1.7% per
annum. Hedged (exept at-the-money) and unhedged returns and their dierenes are statistially
all signiant. Using Hansen's (1982) generalized method of moments (GMM) with at the money,
25-delta, and 10-delta options, we obtain a disaster risk premium of 1% per annum. This estimate is
signiantly dierent from zero, even after taking into aount the small sample size. It represents
approximately one fth of unhedged arry exess returns. To maximize statistial preision, GMM
puts relatively more weight on the deep out-of- the-money options. However, those out-of-the
money options are likely to be the least liquid. A simple "equal weighted" estimator (with equal
weights on the 10-delta, 25-delta, and at-the-money options) puts more weight than the GMM
estimator on the more liquid options, whih is preferable if the liquidity of out-of-the money options
is a major onern.
We investigate the robustness of our results to the presene of transation osts and ounter-
party risk. Bid{ask spreads are easily available on urreny forward rates but not on options. We
thus assume that bid{ask spreads are equal to 5% of implied volatilities for advaned ountries and
10% for other ountries.
3
As a result, our simulated bid{ask spreads inrease in bad times. Their
values are lower than the ones observed during the reent subprime mortgage risis but orrespond
to market estimates. Taking into aount bid{ask spreads and using GMM, we obtain a signiant
estimate of the disaster risk premium, whih in this ase is equal to 1:3% and represents one fourth
of arry exess returns. This is our benhmark estimate. It is a lower bound beause it does not
take into aount ounterparty risk and beause the GMM proedure puts relatively more weight
on options that are deep out-of-the-money. We derive the sensitivity of this estimate to default
probabilities on urreny options markets.
The model also implies strong links between interest rates, ontemporaneous and future hanges
in exhange rates, and the prie of risk reversals { that is, the dierene between the prie of an out-
of-the-money put option and the prie of an out-of-the-money all option with symmetri strikes.
Risk reversals apture the presene of asymmetri downside or upside risk. If the foreign urreny is
expeted to depreiate, then out-of-the money puts should be more expensive than symmetri out-
of-the-money alls. On the other hand, if exhange rates were normally distributed then symmetri
puts and alls should have the same pries. The model predits that: (i) risk reversals inrease
with interest rates; (ii) an inrease in risk reversals is assoiated with a ontemporaneous exhange
rate depreiation reeting the higher riskiness of the urreny; and (iii) high values for risk rever-
sals predit high average future urreny returns beause high exposure to disaster risk must be
ompensated by high returns. We hek these preditions on individual ountries, panel data, and
3
The implied volatility is dened as the volatility neessary to math the observed option prie using a standard
Blak{Sholes formula.
4
urreny portfolios. Empirially, risk reversals inrease with interest rates, as in the model. Prote-
tion against rash risk is more expensive for high{interest rate urrenies than for low{interest rate
ones. We nd, as in the model, that inreases in risk reversals and foreign urreny depreiations
tend to our simultaneously. However, evidene is mixed as to whether risk reversals predit future
exhange rates. Overall, risk reversals appear to ontain useful information on potential disasters.
Building portfolios on the basis of risk reversals delivers a monotoni ross-setion of urreny
exess returns. The implied disaster risk premia is in line with our previous estimates.
We also examine the impliations of our model for the implied volatility smile.
4
We present
a simple alibration of the model that simultaneously mathes our estimate of the disaster risk
premium and provides a good t for the smile observed in the data.
Overall, our model is not rejeted by the data. We reah this onlusion by performing a J-test
of the model's priing errors. This validates our strategy of using a parsimonious and tratable
model. In our view, resorting to a riher but more omplex model would be justied only if we had
aess to a larger data set.
As a ase study of a disaster episode, we use the fall of 2008. This period ertainly represented
bad times { orresponding to a high SDF { as evidened by the deterioration in a large set of
onventional risk measures. For example, during the fall 2008, the U.S. stok market index delined
by 33% in terms of the MSCI index. Consistent with the disaster hypothesis, we doument that
the arry trade performed very poorly during that period: the umulative loss amounted to 17:8%
from September to Deember. This also represents an extreme drop from a statistial perspetive,
sine the standard deviation of monthly arry trade returns over the whole sample is just 2%.
Our estimates of disaster risk premia and arry trade losses during fall 2008 are broadly onsistent
with the ndings and alibration of Barro (2006) and Barro and Ursua (2008, 2009). In our model,
the disaster risk premium depends on two main omponents: (i) the probability of disasters and
the impat of disasters on SDFs, and (ii) the arry trade payos in times of disaster. We use the
fall 2008 episode to alibrate the latter and the values in Barro and Ursua (2008) to haraterize
the former. These parameters imply a disaster risk premium of 2:8%, whih is higher than but
omparable to our estimate of 1:3%. This exerise should be viewed as a bak-of-the-envelope
alulation rather than a rigorous estimate, given that our inferene relies on a single disaster.
Our paper is related to two dierent literatures: the forward premium puzzle and its potential
explanations; and option priing with jumps. Sine the pioneering work of Hansen and Hodrik
(1980) and Fama (1984), many papers have reported deviations from the unovered interest rate
parity (UIP) ondition. These deviations are also known as the forward premium puzzle. In a
4
The implied volatility of an option is a onvenient normalization of the prie of this option as a funtion of its
strike. The smile refers to the relationship between the implied volatility and the strike. We provide formal denitions
in Setion 3 of the paper.
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reent ontribution, Lustig et al. (2008) build a ross-setion of urreny exess returns and show
that it an be explained by ovarianes between returns and return-based risk fators. In order to
repliate this result, stohasti disount fators must have not only a ommon omponent aross
ountries but also heterogenous loadings on this ommon omponent. This paper builds on the
disaster risk literature to satisfy this ondition.
5
Our model derives from Farhi and Gabaix (2008),
who augment the standard onsumption-based model with disaster risk following Rietz (1988) and
Barro (2006). World disaster risk is a ommon omponent, but ountries dier in their exposures
to world disasters. As a result, this paper ontributes to the large literature on peso problems in
international nane.
6
Our paper also belongs to a reent literature using options to investigate the quantitative im-
portane of disasters in urreny markets. Bhansali (2007) was the rst to doument the empirial
properties of hedged arry trade strategies. Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen (2008) show that
risk reversals inrease with interest rates. In their view, the rash risk of the arry trade is due to a
possible unwinding of hedge fund portfolios. This is onsistent with one interpretation of disasters.
Most losely related to this paper, Jurek (2008) provides a omprehensive empirial investigation of
hedged arry trade strategies. He uses deep-out-of-the-money urreny options to derive urreny
rash risk. Jurek's main result { that disaster risk explains 30% to 40% of arry trade returns { is
onsistent with the ndings of this paper, but our approah diers in several dimensions. First, our
model-based empirial strategy leads to a strutural interpretation of the results. Seond, the model
allows us to use a variety of option strikes, inluding more-liquid at-the-money options, in order to
disentangle Gaussian and disaster risk premia. Using at-the-money options, Burnside, Eihenbaum,
Kleshhelski and Rebelo (2008) also nd that disaster risk an aount for the arry trade premium,
where disaster risk omes in the form of a high value of the stohasti disount fator rather than
large arry trade losses. In ontrast to our approah, in their framework the only soure of risk
pried in arry trade returns is disaster risk.
5
Other onsumption-based models repliate the forward premium puzzle. Verdelhan (2009) uses habit preferenes in
the vein of Campbell and Cohrane (1999). Bansal and Shaliastovih (2008) build on the long-run risk model pioneered
by Bansal and Yaron (2004). Guo (2007) presents a disaster-based model with monetary fritions. Ait-Sahalia, Wang
and Yared (2001), Bakus, Chernov and Martin (2009), Barro and Ursua (2009), Bates (2009), Bollerslev and Todorov
(2009), Gabaix (2008), Gourio (2008), Julliard and Ghosh (2008), Liu, Pan and Wang (2005), Martin (2008), Pan
(2002), Santa-Clara and Yan (2009) and Wahter (2008) all study disaster risk on equity and bond markets. Using swap
rates, exhange rate returns, and pries of at-the-money urreny options, Graveline (2006) estimates a two-ountry
term struture model that repliates the forward premium anomaly. Barro (2009) studies the welfare osts of rare
disasters.
6
See Lewis (1995) for a survey. For example, Kaminsky (1993), extending the work of Engel and Hamilton (1990),
onsiders the possibility of rare events explaining investors' expetations about exhange rates. Rare events in her model
are infrequent swithes from ontrationary to expansionary monetary poliy, and she provides evidene that investors'
expetations are onsistent with the model. However, she does not examine the forward premium puzzle and onsiders
only one exhange rate (dollar{sterling) and a short time period.
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A related literature studies high-frequeny data and option priing with jumps, following pioneer-
ing work by Bates (1996a, 1996b), who shows that exhange rate jumps are neessary to explain
option smiles. More reently, Carr and Wu (2007) nd great variations in the riskiness of two ur-
renies (the yen and the British pound) against the U.S. dollar, and they relate it to stohasti risk
premia. Campa, Chang and Reider (1998) doument similar results for some European ross-rates.
Bakshi, Carr and Wu (2008) nd evidene that jump risk is pried in urreny options. However,
the jumps they onsider are high-frequeny jumps, whereas the disasters we have in mind are of
very low frequeny; in Barro (2006), disasters happen every 60 years. As a result, the eonomi
analysis and our eonometri tehnique are very dierent: we annot diretly measure disasters
beause they do not our in our sample { unlike the small jumps that our in studies suh as
Bakshi et al. (2008).
The paper is organized as follows. Setion 2 presents our model and derives its main impliations.
Setion 3 reports our empirial results and Setion 4 onludes. A separate appendix reports proofs
and empirial robustness heks.
2 Theory
We provide a simple model that serves as the basis for our empirial strategy. In the model, expeted
arry trade returns X
e
orrespond to the sum of two risk premia, a "normal times" or Gaussian risk
premium 
G
, and a disaster risk premium 
D
:
X
e
= 
D
+ 
G
:
Here and in what follows, G refers to Gaussian and D refers to disaster.
Our main objetive is to devise a simple strutural estimation proedure to determine 
G
, 
D
and the fration of arry trade returns due to disaster risk. To aomplish this, we use additional
information from hedged arry trade returns. Hedged arry trades are zero-investment trades where
the investor borrows in the funding urreny and then uses the proeeds to invest in the investment
urreny and to purhase protetion against a large depreiation of the investment urreny through
urreny put options.
7
In the model, we derive losed-form solutions for the expeted returns of
hedged arry trades as a funtion of the option strikes. The expeted return X
e
hedged
of a hedged
arry trade is
X
e
hedged
= (1 + )
G
:
7
In this simple overview, returns are omputed in units of the funding urreny. Later in the paper, we also treat
the more general ase where returns are omputed in units of the investment urreny.
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In this formula,  2 ( 1; 0) denotes the delta of the put option hedging the trade. The delta,
whih we dene shortly, is inreasing in the option strike. This is intuitive: the further away from
the money, the more depreiation risk the investor bears and the higher the expeted return of the
hedged arry trade. We will make use of several strikes, with orresponding delta equal to  0:1 for
deep-out-of-the-money options,  0:25 for out-of-the-money options, and  0:5 for at-the-money
options. Hene the expeted returns of a arry trade hedged deep out-of-the-money (10-delta),
out-of-the-money (25-delta), and at-the-money (ATM) are respetively:
X
e
hedged, 10-delta
= 0:9
G
; X
e
hedged, 25-delta
= 0:75
G
; X
e
hedged, ATM
= 0:5
G
:
To the best of our knowledge, this simple deomposition of hedged and unhedged returns is novel.
The rest of the setion is devoted to setting up a model and deriving this result. Our modeling
strategy follows Bakus et al. (2001): we speify a stohasti disount fator for eah ountry.
These SDFs inorporate both a traditional log-normal omponent as in Lustig et al. (2008) and
a disaster omponent as in Farhi and Gabaix (2008). This is enough to ompute all relevant
quantities, returns, and asset pries.
2.1 Model Setup
We fous on two ountries, home and foreign, and develop a two-period model. In order to develop
our empirial appliation, in Setion 3 we explain how to inorporate this building blok in a multi-
ountry, multi-period extension. There, we introdue a state variable 

t
that desribes the state of
the world. The parameters of our two-ountry, two-period model depend on 

t
. All the results in
this setion should be understood as returns onditional on 

t
, but for notational simpliity we do
not make this dependene expliit. In partiular, all the expetations in this setion are onditional
on 

t
.
We assume that nanial markets are omplete but that some fritions prevent perfet risk
sharing aross ountries.
8
Beause we have data only for options on nominal exhange rates, we
hoose to onsider only nominal returns. Therefore, our SDFs should be thought of as nominal
SDFs (i.e., in units of loal urreny).
9
8
An example of suh a frition often used in the literature is the assumption that some goods are not traded. The
assumption of omplete markets is not neessary. Tehnially, our theory requires only the absene of arbitrage and
that risk-free bonds and options with enough strikes be traded. In other words, we rely on the existene of SDFs but
do not need these SDFs to be unique.
9
The link with real priing kernels is well known. If Q
t;t+
is the hange in the quantity of real goods bought by one
unit of the loal urreny and if M
R
t;t+
is the real SDF, then the nominal SDF is M
t;t+
= M
R
t;t+
Q
t;t+
.
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In the home ountry, the log SDF evolves as:
logM
t;t+
=  g + "
p
  
1
2
var (") 
+
{
0 if there is no disaster at time t + 
, log (J) if there is a disaster at time t + 
}
:
We use a supersript star to denote foreign variables. The log of SDF in the foreign ountry evolves
as:
logM
?
t;t+
=  g
?
 + "
?
p
  
1
2
var ("
?
) 
+
{
0 if there is no disaster at time t + 
log (J
?
) if there is a disaster at time t + 
}
:
Observe that the SDFs have two omponents. The rst one,  g + "
p
  
1
2
var (")  , is a
ountry-spei Gaussian risk with an arbitrary degree of orrelation aross ountries. The seond
omponent, log (J), aptures the impat of a disaster on the ountry's SDF.
The probability of a disaster between t and t+ is given by p . Note that disasters are perfetly
orrelated aross the two ountries: disasters are world disasters. Here, g and g
?
are onstants.
The random variables ("; "
?
) are jointly normally distributed with mean 0 and may be orrelated.
However, ("; "
?
) are independent of the nonnegative random variables J and J
?
, whih measure
the magnitudes of the disaster event. All these variables are independent of the realization of the
disaster event.
The \disaster" an have several interpretations. One, hampioned by Rietz (1988) and Barro
(2006), is that of a maroeonomi drop in aggregate onsumption, perhaps due to a war or a major
eonomi risis that aets many ountries. Another interpretation is that of a nanial stress or
risis aeting partiipants in world nanial markets, perhaps via a drasti liquidity shortage and
a violent drop in asset valuations. Both interpretations have merit, and we do not need to take a
stand on the preise nature of a disaster.
This model is extremely tratable. Indeed, it yields losed-form solutions for a number of key
moments of interest. However, this tratability does not ome for free. It relies on a few important
assumptions: that  and 

are jointly normal and independent of the realization of the disaster. As
we shall soon see, our model implies that, onditional on no disasters, the hange in the exhange
rate between home and foreign is an aÆne transformation of 

  . In Setion 3 it is shown that,
within our sample, we annot rejet the hypothesis that the distribution of monthly log exhange
rate hanges onditional on no disaster being lognormal.
10
This validates our assumption that
10
At very high frequenies, exhange rates exhibit fat-tailed distributions. In line with the entral limit theorem,
9

   is normally distributed and independent of the realization of disasters. However, our model
presumes not only that 

   is normal but also that  and 

are both normal.
11
This assumption
on priing kernels is harder to onfront diretly with the data. Setion 3.2 provides an overall test
of the t of the model and fails to rejet it. This result validates our overall strategy of building a
simple and parsimonious model that is onsistent with the data.
2.2 Interest Rates and Exhange Rates
In a omplete markets eonomy suh as ours, the hange in the (nominal) exhange rate is given
by the ratio of the SDFs (Bakus et al., 2001):
S
t+
S
t
=
M
?
t;t+
M
t;t+
;
where S is measured in home urreny per foreign urreny. An inrease in S represents an appre-
iation of the foreign urreny. The exhange rate moves both in normal times and in disasters.
In normal times, the exhange rate inreases following a good realization of the home Gaussian
risk " or a bad realization of the foreign Gaussian risk "
?
. In disasters, the exhange rate inreases
following a good realization of J or a bad realization of J
?
.
It is important to note that a low realization of J
?
orresponds to a depreiation of the foreign
urreny. Hene, a ountry's exposure to disaster risk inreases when the distribution of J
?
dereases
in the rst-order stohasti dominane sense. Atually, we will see shortly that a summary statis
for the foreign ountry's exposure to disaster risk is  pE[J
?
  1℄.
The home interest rate r is determined by the Euler equation 1 = E [M
t;t+
e
r
℄:
r = g   log (1 + pE [J   1℄) =: (1)
A similar expression determines the foreign interest rate. In the limit of small time intervals, this
expression takes a very simple form.
Proposition 1. In the limit of small time intervals  ! 0, the interest rate r in the home ountry
is given by
r = g   pE [J   1℄ :
A similar formula holds for the foreign interest rate. Ceteris paribus, if the foreign ountry has
a higher average disaster risk or a lower pE [J

  1℄, then it also has a higher interest rate. This
however, monthly hanges in exhange rates very often appear to be Gaussian.
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In Setion 3, we return to this issue and disuss how relaxing this hypothesis ould potentially help us redue the
sensitivity of the estimated disaster risk premium on the strikes of the options used for its estimation.
10
higher interest an be understood as ompensation for the risk of holding a urreny that tends to
depreiate in disasters when the SDF is high.
2.3 Options
To determine the payos of hedged arry trades, we need to speify some option-related notation.
We denote by P
t;t+
(K) and C
t;t+
(K) the pries of one-period puts and alls on the home{foreign
urreny pair: P
t;t+
(K) is the home urreny prie of a put yielding (K   S
t+
=S
t
)
+
in the home
urreny, and C
t;t+
(K) is the home urreny prie of a all yielding (S
t+
=S
t
  K)
+
in the home
urreny.
12
The Blak{Sholes formula. Our losed-form solutions for hedged arry trade returns build on
a version of the Blak-Sholes formula. This formula, developed originally by Blak and Sholes
(1973) in the ontext of stoks, was adapted to a foreign exhange setting by Garman and Kohlha-
gen (1983). We denote by V
P
BS
(S;K; ; r; r
?
; ) and V
C
BS
(S;K; ; r; r
?
; ) the Blak{Sholes prie
for a put and a all, respetively, when the spot is S; the strike is K, the volatility is , the time
to maturity is  , the home interest rate is r , and the foreign interest rate is r
?
. For example, the
Blak{Sholes prie of a put is given by
V
P
BS
(S;K; ; r; r
?
; ) = Ke
 r
N( d
2
)  Se
 r
?

N( d
1
);
where N is the umulative distribution funtion of a Gaussian and where
d
1
=
log(S=K) + (r   r
?
+ 
2
=2)

p

; d
2
= d
1
  
p
:
The Blak{Sholes formula has a simple saling property with respet to the time to maturity
 and the interest rates r and r
?
:
V
P
BS
(S;K; ; r; r
?
; ) = V
P
BS
(Se
 r
?

; Ke
 r
; 
p
; 0; 0; 1):
This saling property means that we an use the formula whenever the time to maturity is equal
to 1 and both interest rates are 0. For notational onveniene, we will omit the arguments 0 and
1 and simply write
V
P
BS
(S;K; )  V
P
BS
(S;K; ; 0; 0; 1):
12
We use the notation: y
+
 max (0; y).
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The delta of options. The delta of an option is the sensitivity (or the partial derivative) of the
option prie to a hange in the underlying exhange rate. The delta of a put is negative beause
the value of a put inreases when the underlying urreny depreiates. The delta dereases with
the strike of a put: a deep-out-of-the-money put has a delta lose to 0, while a deep-in-the-money
has a delta lose to  e
 r
?

. For example, in the Blak{Sholes model, the delta of a put is given
by
V
P
BS
(S;K; ; r; r
?
; )=S =  e
 r
?

N( d
1
):
We will often onsider the limit of short time to maturity. The delta of the option then has a
simple interpretation: it is the probability that the put will be exerised. More formally, the delta
of a put option with time to maturity  and strike Se

p

has the following limit:
13

P
BS
()  lim
!0
V
P
BS
(S; Se

p

; ; r; r
?
; )=S =  N(=) 2 ( 1; 0);
where the partial derivative is taken with respet to the rst argument.
For example,  = 0 for at-the-money options and so the delta of an ATM put is  1=2.
2.4 Hedged and Unhedged Carry Trade Returns
We ompute returns in units of the home urreny. However, we want to allow for the possibility
that home might be both the funding urreny (if r < r
?
) and the investment urreny (if r > r
?
).
Hene we dene two arry trade payos X and Y that orrespond to these two ases:
X
t;t+
= e
r
?

S
t+
S
t
  e
r
;
Y
t;t+
=  X
t;t+
:
The payo X
t;t+
orresponds to the following trade: at date t, borrow one unit of the home
urreny at rate r and invest the proeeds in the foreign urreny at rate r
?
. At the end of the
trade, at date t+ , onvert the proeeds bak into the home urreny. The payo Y
t;t+
=  X
t;t+
orresponds to the opposite trade.
In the main text, we treat the ase where the home urreny is the funding urreny (r <
r

). The orresponding derivations an be found in Appendix A. In Appendix B, we derive the
orresponding results for the ase where home is the investment urreny.
We now onstrut the hedged arry trade returns, X
t;t+
(K). The return X
t;t+
(K) is the
payo of the following zero-investment trade: borrow one unit of the home urreny at interest
13
In this equation,  is a normalized measure of the moneyness of the option.
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rate r ; use the proeeds to buy 
P
t;t+
(K) puts with strike K, proteting against a depreiation in
the foreign urreny; and invest the remainder
(
1  
P
t;t+
(K)P
t;t+
(K)
)
in the foreign urreny at
interest rate r
?
. Here P
t;t+
(K) is the home urreny prie of a put yielding (K   S
t+
=S
t
)
+
in
the home urreny,
X
t;t+
(K) =
(
1  
P
t;t+
(K)P
t;t+
(K)
)
e
r
?

S
t+
S
t
+ 
P
t;t+
(K)
(
K  
S
t+
S
t
)
+
  e
r
;
where we hoose the hedge ratio 
P
t;t+
(K) to eliminate disaster risk:

P
t;t+
(K) = e
r
?

=
(
1 + P (K) e
r
?

)
:
Of foremost interest to us is the annualized expeted returns, onditional on no disasters, of
two strategies: the unhedged arry trade, X
e
, and the hedged arry trades, X
e
(), at strike e

p

over short horizons  . These returns orrespond to the following limiting ases:
X
e
= lim
!0
E
ND
[X
t;t+
℄ =;
X
e
() = lim
!0
E
ND
[
X
t;t+
(
e

p

)]
=:
To summarize our notation: X
t;t+
denotes the arry trade return and X
e
is its expeted value;
X
t;t+
(e

p

) denotes the hedged arry trade return with strike K = e

p

and X
e
() is the expeted
value of that hedged arry trade return. E
ND
denotes expetations under the assumption of no
disaster.
The following proposition oers a deomposition of these returns in terms of disaster and
Gaussian risk premia.
Proposition 2. In the limit of small time intervals ( ! 0), arry trade expeted returns (onditional
on no disasters) are given by
X
e
= pE [J   J
?
℄ + ov ("; "  "
?
) : (2)
In the same limit, hedged arry trade expeted returns (onditional on no disasters) are given by
X
e
() =  pE
[
(J
?
  J)
+
]
+ ov ("; "  "
?
)
(
1 + 
P
BS
()
)
: (3)
The rst term in equation (2) is the risk premium assoiated with disaster risk:

D
 pE [J   J
?
℄ :
13
If the foreign ountry is riskier, then E [J   J
?
℄ > 0 and the expeted return due to disaster risk is
positive. The seond term in (2) is the risk premium assoiated with \Gaussian risk"a la Bakus et
al. (2001):
14

G
 ov ("; "  "
?
) ;
this is the ovariane between the home SDF and the bilateral exhange rate S
t+
=S
t
. In our
model, the expeted return of the arry trade ompensates for the exposure to these two soures
of risk.
The purhase of protetion against extreme depreiation aets the loading of the arry trade
payo on the two soures of risk in the model. This is reeted in the expression for the expeted
value of the hedged arry trade return in equation (3). The disaster risk premium 
D
is redued to
pE [(J
?
  J)
+
℄, whih equals zero if J > J
?
almost surely. The Gaussian risk premium 
G
is redued
to ov ("; "  "
?
)
(
1 + 
P
BS
()
)
. This an be understood as follows: beause the put option has a
sensitivity to urreny hanges that is equal to the option delta 
P
BS
(), hedging redues the risk
premium orresponding to Gaussian risk by ov ("; "  "
?
) j
P
BS
()j. We will expand on the intuition
for this term in Setion 2.5.
Implied volatilities. To put Proposition 2 to work, we use implied volatilities. The implied volatility
^
t;t+
(K) of a put with strike K is dened impliitly as the volatility that would make the Blak{
Sholes prie math the observed prie of the option:
P
t;t+
(K) = e
 r


V
P
BS
(
1; Ke
(r
?
 r)
; ^
t;t+
(K)
p

)
:
A similar denition holds for all options. By the put{all parity formula, the implied volatility of
a put and a all having the same strike and maturity are equal. We now state a lemma that will
simplify the empirial analysis.
Lemma 1. In the limit of small time intervals ( ! 0), the Blak{Sholes implied volatility
^
t;t+
(
e

p

)
of a put or a all with strike e

p

is given by var ("
?
  ")
1=2
.
Lemma 1 states that, in the limit of small time intervals, the implied volatility is equal to the
14
Bakus et al. (2001) show that, if markets are omplete and SDFs are log normal, then expeted log urreny
exess returns are equal to E(logR
e
) = 1=2V ar(logM)   1=2V ar(logM
?
). We fous here instead on the log of
expeted urreny exess returns, but the two expressions are naturally onsistent. Starting from Bakus et al. (2001),
we obtain:
logE(R
e
) = E(logR
e
) +
1
2
var(R
e
) =
1
2
var(") 
1
2
var("
?
) +
1
2
var("  "
?
)
= var(")  ov("; "
?
);
14
physial Gaussian volatility of the bilateral exhange rate, var ("
?
  ")
1=2
. This is true even though
our model ontains both normal-times risk and disaster risk. The intuition is as follows. For options
lose to the money, the value of the option due to disasters is proportional to p , the probability
that the disaster will our during the lifetime  of the option. This is very small ompared to the
value of the option due to normal-times volatility, whih is proportional to
p
 . Hene, for small
maturities and strikes lose to the money, most of the value of the option omes from Gaussian risk
rather than disaster risk. Correspondingly, the implied volatility of the option is well approximated
by the physial volatility of the exhange rate.
In the ase of short-dated options with near-the-money strikes, Lemma 1 implies that we an
use the Blak{Sholes implied volatilities ^
t;t+
(
e

p

)
instead of the physial Gaussian volatility
var ("
?
  ")
1=2
when omputing 
P
BS
() in equation (3). This is true even though { owing to the
presene of disasters { the assumptions of the Blak{Sholes model do not hold.
As a result, we need not to foreast future volatility ountry by ountry (whih would be diÆult
given that market partiipants have more information than we do). We an instead rely on option-
implied volatilities. The quality of this approximation deteriorates for out-of-the-money options, in
whih ases the implied volatility is larger than the physial volatility. Our proedure will then bias
our estimates of option deltas away from 0, leading to an overestimation of Gaussian risk premia
and an underestimation of disaster risk premia.
Rather than using the underlying options strike, traders in pratie routinely use its Blak{
Sholes delta, whih is a onventional quantity omputed as
 e
 r


N
(

p
 + (r   r

  ^
2
=2) 
^
p

)
:
Note that this quantity might dier from the true sensitivity of the option with respet to the
fundamental. However, it onverges to 
P
BS
() =  e
 r
?

N( d
1
) in the limit of small time intervals.
Using Lemma 1 therefore provides us with a useful simpliation: in the limit of small time
intervals, the onventional deltas that traders use to quote urreny options oinide not only with
the true deltas of the options but also with the quantity 
P
BS
() featured in our model.
In pratie, this approximation is valid when the disaster risk premium p(J

  J) is small in
absolute value ompared to the option prie, whih is of order 
p
 (where  > 0 depends on ).
Therefore, our approximation will be valid only if   (= (p jJ   J
?
j))
2
. Numerially, with yearly
units volatility is about 10% so  ' 0:1. The disaster part of the arry trade risk premium is, in
order of magnitude, 1.5%, so p jJ

  Jj ' 0:015.
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Thus we need   44
2
. For at-the-money
options,  = 1=
p
2 and the ondition is   44
2
= 6:9 years. Beause we use one-month options
15
For this analysis we need not to deompose the relative ontributions of p and J

  J, as Farhi and Gabaix (2008)
do. Only the value of the disaster risk premium, p(J
?
  J) , matters.
15
( = 1=12), our approximation is expeted to be valid in pratie. Furthermore, in pratie the ratio
of the implied volatility of 10-delta and 25-delta options to the implied volatility of ATM options
typially lies between 1 and 1.2. Hene, using the volatility ATM rather than the implied volatility
at 10-delta would hange the fator 1 +  of 10-delta options from 0.9 to 0.94; for the 25-delta
options, the 1 +  fator would be equal to 0.79 instead of 0.75.
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These orretions would imply
only trivial modiations to our empirial estimates, muh below their reported standard errors.
2.5 Estimating the Contribution of Disasters
The expeted return of the unhedged arry trade in equation (2) an be re-expressed as
X
e
= 
D
+ 
G
: (4)
Assume that J
?
< J almost surely: this means that the exhange rate of the foreign ountry will
depreiate with respet to the home ountry in ase of a disaster. A put option protets the investor
against a large depreiation assoiated with disasters and also against more a modest depreiation
resulting from Gaussian risk. As a onsequene, the hedged arry trade is less risky and ommands
a lower risk premium. The further out of the money the put option is, the more risk the investor
bears, and so the higher the hedged arry trade return. Indeed, we an re-express (3) as
X
e
() = 
G
(
1 + 
P
BS
()
)
:
For instane, take the arry trade hedged with at-the-money options ( = 0). In this ase,

P
BS
() =  1=2 and X
e
() = 0:5
G
. The expeted return of the arry trade hedged at the money
is equal to half of the no-disaster risk premium 
G
.
17
The intuition here is that the hedge eliminates all the disaster risk and half the Gaussian risk.
That exatly half of the Gaussian risk is eliminated might seem surprising, given that the SDF puts
more weight on depreiation of the foreign urreny than on its appreiation. The intuition is as
follows. In the limit of small time horizons  ! 0, the shape of the distribution is a Gaussian with
standard deviation 
p
 , whereas the adjustments for risk that govern the dierene between the
physial and risk-adjusted probability are muh smaller { of the order of magnitudes of  . Together
with the fat that the Gaussian distribution is symmetri around 0, this implies X
e
(0) = 0:5
G
.
16
With an upper bound of 1.1, the numbers are 0.92 and 0.77; with an upper bound of 1.3, they are 0.95 and 0.81.
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An informal explanation runs as follows. The arry trade has a \disaster beta" of 1, and a \Gaussian" beta of 1.
Hene, its risk premium is 
D
+ 
G
. On the other hand, the arry trade hedged at the money has a disaster beta of
0 and a Gaussian risk beta of 1=2 (as we saw earlier, it eliminates half the Gaussian risk). Hene, its risk premium is
0:5
G
. Likewise, the arry trade hedged at 10 delta has a disaster beta of 0 and a Gaussian risk beta of 0:9 (beause
it eliminates 10% of the Gaussian risk), so its risk premium is 0:9
G
.
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Next, take the arry trade hedged with a put option at 25 delta. In the language of urreny
traders, this means that the strike is suh that the delta of the put is  0:25; thus X
e
() = 0:75
G
.
Likewise, for the arry trade hedged at 10 delta, we get X
e
() = 0:9
G
. Again, the intuition is
that, sine that the hedge uses a relatively deep-out-of-the-money put, investors bear muh of the
Gaussian risk but not all of it: they bear 90% of the risk, so that the expeted return of the arry
trade at 10 delta is 0:9 times the Gaussian risk premium.
The method behind our estimation proedure is to use expeted returns of dierent investment
strategies with dierent loadings on disaster and Gaussian risks to derive 
G
and 
D
. Alternatively,
option pries an also be used diretly to make some inferene about those risk premia. We turn
to this issue in the next setion.
2.6 Risk Reversals
Roughly speaking, if the foreign urreny is riskier than the home urreny, then out-of-the-money
put pries on the urreny pair (home, foreign) should be higher than out-of-the-money all pries,
sine the prie of protetion against a devaluation of the foreign urreny should be high. In this
setion we onstrut a simple metri { risk reversals { to measure the gap between the out-of-the-
money puts and out-of-the money alls.
One tradition is to onstrut risk reversals as the implied volatility of an out-of-the-money put,
minus the implied volatility of a symmetri out-of-the-money all. A more theoretially appealing
denition for our purposes involves looking at the dierene between the pries of put and alls
rather than at the dierene between their implied volatilities. More preisely, we all F = e
(r r
?
)
the forward rate of the bilateral exhange rate S
t+
=S
t
. We use k , whih in pratie is lose to 1,
in order to indiate the moneyness of the options. For instane, for puts and alls orresponding
to movements of 10% from the forward rate, k = 1:1. We dene the risk reversal to be
RR(Fk) = P
(
Fk
 1
)
  k
 1
C (Fk) : (5)
Risk reversals are the prie of one put with strike Fk
 1
minus k
 1
alls with strike Fk , whih
is symmetri with respet to the money forward rate F . For instane, in the previous ase where
k = 1:1, the risk reversal is the prie of a put proteting against a 10% depreiation of the foreign
urreny minus 0.9 units of a all paying o symmetrially (i.e., if the foreign urreny appreiates
by 10%).
The next lemma gives the reason for the denition in equation (5): if there is only Gaussian
risk, then the risk reversal is exatly 0.
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Lemma 2. If there is no disaster risk, then the risk reversal is exatly zero, for all strikes: RR (Fk) =
0 for all k > 0.
On the other hand, if there is disaster risk then the risk reversal is basially the prie of an out-
of-the-money put (in the previous example, proteting against a 10% depreiation of the foreign
urreny) minus the prie of a symmetri all (e.g., proteting against a 10% appreiation of the
foreign urreny). Hene, if the foreign ountry has more rash risk than the home ountry, its risk
reversal is positive.
In the next proposition, we haraterize the limit prie of risk reversals for strikes in the parametri
lass e

p

:
Proposition 3. In the limit of small time intervals, the prie of risk reversals is given by
lim
!0
RR(Fe

p

)= = pE
[
(J   J
?
)
+
  (J
?
  J)
+
]
+ 2(1 + 
P
BS
())pE [(J
?
  J)℄ : (6)
Consider a risk reversal at-the-money forward ( = 0) in the ase where J > J
?
almost surely.
Then, 
P
BS
(0) =  1=2 and lim
!0
RR(Fe

p

)= = 0. In other words, disaster risk generates non
trivial risk reversals only for strikes away from the money.
Risk reversals on the urreny pair (home, foreign) essentially apture the relative loadings on
disaster risk of the home urreny and the foreign urreny in the following sense. If the distribution
of J
?
dereases in a rst-order stohasti dominane sense (i.e., if the foreign urreny bears more
rash risk), then the value of the risk reversal is weakly higher (lim
!0
RR(Fe

p

)= is weakly
higher).
We an also onsider strikes that do not sale as 
p
 in the limit of short time horizons. If
instead the strike is onstant at K > 0, then the delta of the orresponding put option is equal to
 1. In this ase, the prie of deep-out-of-the money risk reversals is
lim
!0
RR(K)= = pE
[(
K
 1
J   J
?
)
+
 
(
K
 1
J
?
  J
)
+
]
: (7)
We onlude this setion with a proposition linking risk reversals to interest rates.
Proposition 4. In the domain where the foreign ountry has more disaster risk than the home
ountry (J > J

), eteris paribus, the more the foreign ountry is exposed to disaster risk (the lower
is J
?
in the sense of rst-order stohasti dominane), the higher are the interest rate dierential
r

  r and the short-maturity risk reversal.
Proposition 4 is natural. Riskier ountries should have higher interest rates as we have already
seen, and they should have higher pries of put premia beause they bear important rash risk: their
18
risk reversals are higher. An analogous proposition naturally holds if the foreign ountry has less
disaster risk than the home ountry.
3 Estimation
The theoretial results presented in the previous setion guide our empirial work on arry trade
returns. From a methodologial perspetive, the model has two main impliations: urreny exess
returns inrease with interest rates, and urreny options allow the estimation of disaster risk
premia. We follow these two insights. Beause the forward premium puzzle implies that risk premia
are time-varying, we build portfolios of urreny exess returns by sorting ountries based on their
interest rates. By doing so, we obtain urreny exess returns that are signiantly dierent from
zero and apture expeted exess returns from urreny markets. We apply this methodology to
unhedged and hedged urreny exess returns. As a result, we obtain the empirial ounterparts
to the expeted exess returns desribed in the previous setion. Using the losed-form expressions
derived there, we estimate the market ompensation for rash risk.
3.1 Data
We rst desribe our data set and how we build urreny portfolios, and then turn to our results on
disaster risk premia. We start o with spot, forward, and option ontrats on urreny markets.
Spot, forward, and urreny options. All exhange rates in our sample are in U.S. dollar per
foreign urreny. As a result, an inrease in the exhange rate orresponds to an appreiation of
the foreign urreny and a deline of the U.S. dollar. For eah urreny, our sample presents spot
and forward exhange rates at the end of the month and implied volatilities from urreny options
for the same dates. We onsider one-month forward rates and options with one-month maturity.
Longer-term ontrats are available but muh less traded. We onstrut foreign interest rates using
forward urreny rates and the U.S. LIBOR, assuming that the overed interest rate parity ondition
holds.
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Options are quoted using their Blak and Sholes implied volatilities for ve dierent deltas.
19
Our sample omprises deep-out-of-the-money puts (denoted 10 delta puts), out-of-the-money puts
18
In normal onditions, forward rates satisfy the overed interest rate parity ondition (CIP): forward disounts (e.g.,
the log dierenes between forward and spot rates) equal the interest rate dierentials between two ountries. Akram,
Rime and Sarno (2008) study high-frequeny deviations from CIP and onlude that CIP holds at daily and lower
frequenies.
19
Jorion (1995), Carr and Wu (2007) and Corte, Sarno and Tsiakas (2009) study the features of these urreny
options.
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(25 delta puts), at-the-money puts and alls, out-of-the money alls (25 delta alls) and deep-out-
of-the money alls (10 delta alls) for the 1996{2008 period.
20
Figure 3 presents, as an example, the
implied volatilities of the urreny options in our sample at the end of August 2008. If the underlying
risk-neutral distributions of exhange rates were purely log-normal, then these lines would be at:
implied volatilities would not dier aross strike pries. This is learly not the ase here. Note
for instane that the implied volatility urve is dereasing for Australia or New Zealand (two high{
interest rate ountries at that time) and inreasing for Japan or Switzerland (two low{interest rate
ountries). These urves signal departures from the normality assumption. Let us take a simple
example. A high implied volatility for an out-of-the-money all option implies that the probability of
a foreign urreny appreiation is higher than in a normal distribution. At the end of August 2008,
option pries reet large probabilities of appreiation for the Japanese yen and Swiss fran as well
as large probabilities of depreiation for the Australian and New Zealand dollars. These expeted
hanges atually ourred in the next months.
Using these spot, forward, and option ontrats, we now build unhedged and hedged urreny
exess returns following the denitions presented in Setion 2.4.
Portfolios of unhedged and hedged urreny exess returns. For eah individual urreny, we
onstrut the orresponding exess return from the perspetive of a U.S. investor. We onsider
two ases: the investor goes either long or short in the foreign urreny. In eah ase, we build the
hedged exess return obtained by buying protetion on the option market against an unfavorable
hange in the foreign urreny. When the U.S. investor is long in the foreign urreny he buys a
put ontrat, thereby proteting himself against a depreiation of the foreign urreny. When he is
short, he buys a all ontrat. Again, the strike prie of these options ontrats is either far out of
the money (at 10 delta), out of the money (at 25 delta), or at the money.
We sort urrenies on their forward disounts and alloate them into three portfolios, rebalaning
every month. The rst portfolio ontains the lowest{interest rate urrenies while the last portfolio
ontains the highest{interest rate urrenies. By sorting urrenies on their risk harateristis,
we fous on soures of aggregate risk and average out idiosynrati variations. When omputing
portfolio averages, we use equal weights for all urrenies. We obtain average urreny exess
returns, average implied volatilities, and average risk reversals for eah portfolio.
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By using data from the Chiago Merantile Exhange, we ould have extended the sample to 1986 for three
urrenies (Canadian dollar, Swiss fran, and yen) and to 1994 for two others (Australian dollar and British pound).
Unfortunately CME data do not provide at eah date a onstant variety of option strikes, whih is ruial for our
estimation proedure.
21
Note that the hedge strategy requires buying one option for every urreny in the portfolio. In essene, this
amounts to buying protetion against adverse movements of every urreny in the portfolio against the U.S. dollar.
Another potentially interesting strategy onsists of buying a single option to protet against an adverse movement of
20
The onnetion with the theory developed in Setion 2 is as follows. The dierent ountries
are indexed by i 2 I. A state variable 

t
desribes the state of the world at date t. This state
variable follows an arbitrary stationary stohasti proess. All the parameters of the model are
arbitrary funtions of 

t
: p, g
i
, J
i
and ov("
i
; "
j
). Correspondingly all the omputed variables r
i
,
X
e
i
, X
e
()
i
, 
D
i
and 
G
i
depend on 

t
. Underlying our three portfolios are the three state-dependent
sets I
1
(

t
), I
2
(

t
), and I
3
(

t
).
High interest rates r
i
an be due to high values of g
i
or to low values of pE[J
i
  1℄. If disaster
risk is an important determinant of ross-ountry variations in interest rates, then a portfolio formed
by seleting ountries with high{interest rates will, on average, selet ountries that feature high
disaster risk,  E[J
i
℄. The empirial analysis that follows indeed onrms that.
Sample. Our data set omes from JP Morgan. It ontains 32 urrenies: Argentina, Australia,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Columbia, Czeh Republi, Denmark, Euro area, Hong Kong, India,
Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Mexio, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Singa-
pore, South Afria, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom,
and Venezuela. Following the World Eonomi Outlook (IMF, 2008) lassiation, we split the
sample between advaned ountries and emerging ountries.
22
There are two main reasons to fous on advaned ountries: the higher liquidity of their option
markets and the normality of their returns. We fous here on normality tests and investigate later
the impat of transation osts.
Our model implies that, as long as a urreny rash does not our in sample, hanges in
exhange rate are onditionally normally distributed. We hek this impliation in our data, limiting
rst our attention to the 1/1996 { 8/2008 period. We exlude the last four months of our sample
beause, during the fall of 2008, high{interest rate urrenies depreiated and low{interest rate
urrenies appreiated sharply. Carry trades thus paid very badly in the fall of 2008, when stok
markets tumbled worldwide and liquidity dried up. We take the view that this period represents an
example of disasters in our sample and will pay speial attention to this partiular period in the next
setion. For now, we exlude it from our sample.
Table 9 in Appendix C reports higher moments of hanges in exhange rates along with the
standard Jarque and Bera (1980) and Lilliefors (1967) normality tests for eah urreny available
over this period. The left panel fouses on advaned ountries. Bootstrapping the skewness and
kurtosis statistis, we nd that the sample values are not signiantly dierent from the Gaussian
the basket of urrenies in this portfolio. However, we do not have data on basket options and so we do not pursue
that route.
22
The Word Eonomi Outlook lassiation ombines three riteria: (i) per apita GDP, (ii) export diversiation,
and (iii) integration into the global nanial system.
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ones for all ountries, exept for South Korea and Singapore. The Lilliefors test leads to the
same onlusion. The Jarque{Bera test rejets normality more often (adding the United Kingdom
and Japan to the list), but the test is known to over-rejet in short samples. The omparison
with the right panel, whih fouses on emerging ountries, is striking. There, most exhange rate
distributions dier from normality. Most rejetions ome from high kurtosis.
23
If we inlude fall
2008 in our sample, the reent large hanges in exhange rates lead to rejetion of the normal
distribution even for many advaned ountries.
Our model implies that onditional hanges in exhange rates are normal. Yet the normality
tests reported so far are unonditional, and exhange rates tend to exhibit time-varying volatility.
To take into aount suh heterosedastiity, we estimate a GARCH (1, 1) model for eah urreny.
We then run normality tests on exhange rate hanges normalized by their volatility. To save spae,
we report results in Table 10 in Appendix C. After the GARCH (1, 1) orretion, all advaned
ountries, exept South Korea, exhibit onditionally Gaussian exhange rates in our sample. Most
emerging ountries, however, still fail normality tests.
As a result, we fous here on our sample of advaned ountries (exluding South Korea) over the
1/1996{8/2008 period.
24
We turn now to our main empirial results. Note that results obtained
with the whole sample of advaned and emerging ountries are reported in Appendix C as robustness
heks. In that appendix we also onsider a smaller sample of the nine most advaned ountries as
in Jurek (2008).
3.2 Results
We rst present the key harateristis of our urreny portfolios and then fous on measures of
disaster risk premia.
Portfolio harateristis. Forming portfolios is a way to ompute moments onditional on the
three sets I
1
, I
2
, and I
3
. Of partiular interest to us will be three of these moments: arry trade
returns and the orresponding disaster and Gaussian risk premia. For instane, the expeted return
on portfolio k is simply the average return over the ountries in the portfolio:
X
e
k
= E
[∑
i2I
k
(

t
)
X
e
i
(

t
)
#I
k
(

t
)
]
;
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We also report, in Appendix C, higher moments and normality tests for our portfolios of urreny exess returns. In
our benhmark sample of advaned ountries, the Lilliefors test annot rejet the normality assumption for any of our
portfolios. In our large sample of advaned and emerging ountries, however, the high{interest rate portfolios exhibit
fat tails and thus learly depart from normality.
24
Our sample onsists of Canada, Czeh Republi, Denmark, Euro area, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, and United Kingdom
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where I
k
denotes the set of urrenies in portfolio k . Similarly, the expeted hedged return on
portfolio k is:
X
e
k
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]
:
Table 1 reports average urreny exess returns that are either unhedged, hedged at 10 delta,
hedged at 25 delta, or hedged at the money. Average urreny exess returns inrease monotonially
from the rst to the last portfolio. This is not a surprise: we know from the empirial literature on
the unovered interest rate parity that high{interest rate urrenies tend to appreiate on average.
As a result, investors in these urrenies gain both the interest rate dierential and the foreign
exhange rate appreiation. Hedging downside risks dereases average returns. A hedge at 10 delta
protets the investor against large drops in foreign urrenies, whereas a hedge at the money protets
the investor against any depreiation of the foreign urreny: the latter insurane is obviously more
expensive beause it overs more states of nature and thus leads to lower exess returns.
For eah portfolio, we also report in Table 2 the average implied volatility at dierent strikes.
One result stands out: the average implied volatility of high{interest rate urrenies (e.g., portfolio
3) is muh higher for out-of-the-money put options than for other strikes and other portfolios.
Option markets prie a large depreiation risk for high{interest rate urrenies. The same insight
is apparent in risk reversals.
The last panel of Table 2 presents average risk reversals at delta 10 and 25 delta:
RR
k
= E
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i2I
k
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)
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k
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)
]
:
Reall that risk reversals orrespond to positions that are long put and short all options. As
a result, higher levels of risk reversals indiate higher probabilities of depreiation for the foreign
urreny. We report risk reversals quoted in terms of implied volatilities. As in the model, risk
reversals inrease monotonially with interest rates. Higher{interest rate urrenies have higher
probabilities of depreiation. This result is in line with the premises of our model, whih introdues
the risk of large-sale depreiation in urreny markets.
The strong link between interest rates and risk reversals suggests a omparable sorting that uses
risk reversals instead of interest rates. Underlying this onstrution are three dierent portfolio sets
with their orresponding onditional moments. Here again we obtain a monotonially inreasing
ross-setion of exess returns. Table 3 reports hedged and unhedged average exess returns.
Countries with higher levels of risk reversals tend to oer higher urreny returns on average. The
dierene in unhedged returns between the last and rst portfolio is lower than in our previous
portfolios, but it is still signiant.
We now turn to the diret estimation of the market's ompensation for bearing disaster risk.
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Disaster risk premia. In order to estimate disaster risk premia, we fous on a zero-investment
strategy that goes long on high{interest rate urrenies and short on low{interest rate urrenies.
This strategy orresponds to usual urreny arry trades.
The expeted return of the arry trade is X
e
= X
e
3
  X
e
1
. It an be deomposed as the sum
of a disaster risk premium 
D
and a Gaussian risk premium 
G
. The disaster risk premium is the
dierene between the average disaster risk premium in portfolio 3 and the average disaster risk
premium in portfolio 1:
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Similarly, the Gaussian risk premium is the dierene between the average Gaussian risk premium
in portfolio 3 and the average Gaussian risk premium in portfolio 1:
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:
The average unhedged return of this strategy is equal to 6.5% per year in our sample. It
orresponds to the sum of the average return on the third portfolio in the left panel of Table
1 (when the investor is long on the foreign urreny) and the rst portfolio in the right panel
(when the investor is short on the foreign urreny). We also report hedged arry trades at 10
delta, 25 delta, and at-the-money (ATM). They orrespond to X
e
() = X
e
3
()   X
e
1
(). The
rst panel of Table 4 presents these average arry exess returns and their standard errors. The
latter are obtained by bootstrapping the monthly exess returns under the assumption that they are
independent and identially distributed (i.i.d.). As a result, these standard errors take into aount
the short sample size. Carry exess returns that are either unhedged or hedged at 10 delta and 25
delta are statistially dierent from zero. Carry returns hedged at the money are positive but not
signiant. The dierenes between unhedged and hedged returns are all positive and signiant.
The seond panel of Table 4 reports strutural estimates of the disaster risk omponent (
D
)
and the Gaussian risk omponent (
G
). We start with simple estimates that only require omputing
averages, and then we turn to GMM estimates.
As derived in the previous setion, unhedged exess returns orrespond to the sum of 
D
and

G
. Hedged exess returns are approximately equal to 
G
multiplied by a orretion fator related
to the delta of the option. To estimate 
D
and 
G
, we rst orret eah average hedged return
for its delta omponent:
^
X
e
() = X
e
()=(1 + 

);
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where X
e
() orresponds to the average arry return hedged at delta  ( = 10, 25, or at-the-
money) and 

denotes the option delta (respetively equal to  0:1,  0:25, and  0:5). Setion
2.5 shows that the expeted value of eah
^
X
e
() is simply 
G
. So, we form our estimate of the
Gaussian risk premium as a simple weighted average of the delta-orreted hedged arry trade
returns:
25
̂
G
=
∑
2I
^
X
e
()
N
; (8)
where N is the number of hedged exess returns onsidered. For instane, N = 1 when we use
ATM options only and N = 3 when we use 10 delta, 25 delta and ATM options.
As warranted by the analysis in Setion 2.5, our estimate of the disaster risk premium is the
average unhedged arry trade return, X
e
, minus the estimate of the Gaussian premium:
̂
D
= X
e
  ̂
G
: (9)
We report four sets of estimates obtained using the methodology just desribed and four dierent
sets of hedged returns: 10 delta (rst olumn), 25 delta (seond olumn), at-the-money (third
olumn) hedged returns along with the previous three hedged returns ombined together (fourth
olumn). Note that we estimate two risk premia, 
D
and 
G
, using either two (rst, seond,
and third olumns) or four moments (fourth olumn). Again, standard errors are obtained by
bootstrapping the monthly exess returns under the assumptions that they are i.i.d. Depending on
the speiation, Gaussian risk premia range from 3.4% to 5.3%; disaster risk premia amount to
1.2% to 3.1% annually. The latter aount for approximately 20% to 50% of the average arry
trade returns in our sample. The lower estimate is obtained when using only deep-out-of-the-money
options. Disaster risk premia are signiantly dierent from zero in all ases, exept when using
solely at-the-money options.
Our previous estimates of disaster risk premia, obtained with simple averages, orrespond to the
minimization of the sum of squared dierenes between empirial and theoretial exess returns.
We now turn to Hansen's (1982) GMM estimates of disaster risk premia. We use all the available
unhedged and hedged exess returns and thus have four moments to estimate two parameters. The
other ases reported previously are just-identied with two moments to determine two parameters.
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This estimate orresponds to the minimization of:
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:
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This estimate orresponds to the minimization of g
0
T
W
 1
g
T
; where W is the variane{ovariane matrix of all
hedged and unhedged returns and where g
T
desribes all moment onditions: g
T
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A then the estimate minimizes g
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T
; this orresponds to the "square" of
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In order to weight the dierent moments, we use the ovariane matrix of all hedged and unhedged
returns. We do not use a spetral density matrix beause of the short length of our sample. We
obtain a disaster risk premium of 1% (with a standard error of 0.4) and a Gaussian risk premium
of 4.8% (with a standard error of 1.9). The disaster risk premium obtained with all hedged returns
is lose to the one obtained with 10-delta returns. This happens beause the standard deviation of
delta-orreted ATM hedged returns is muh higher than the other ones. As a result, the GMM
estimation underweights this moment, whih previously delivered the higher estimate of disaster risk
premia. This proedure thus gives a lower bound on disaster risk premia. Note also that the GMM
estimation does not impose the ondition that unhedged exess returns are the sum of disaster and
Gaussian risk premia.
We hek our results on dierent portfolios that feature either dierent sorts or dierent oun-
tries. We obtain similar results on portfolios of urreny exess returns sorted on risk reversals.
Reall that these portfolios deliver a monotoni ross-setion of returns and oer a arry exess
return of 3.2% annually. Table 5 reports estimates of the orresponding Gaussian and disaster risk
premia. The former varies from 1.3% to 1.7%, and the latter ranges from to 1.4% to 1.9%. Again,
all estimates exept the one using solely at-the-money options, are statistially signiant. Disaster
risk premia aount for approximately 40%{60% perent of the long{short returns on these risk
reversal{based portfolios.
As robustness heks, we onsider two additional samples: either all the developed and emerging
ountries in our data set or a subset of nine developed ountries (Australia, Canada, Euro area,
Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom). To save spae, we report
all tables in Appendix C.
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We obtain very similar estimates on the small sample of nine developed
ountries as before on our larger sample of advaned ountries. Using GMM, we obtain a disaster
risk premium of 1.1%, whih aounts for 25% of the arry trade returns. We obtain somehow lower
disaster risk premia on our large sample of advaned and emerging ountries. Emerging markets,
however, present lower liquidity and higher bid{ask spreads as we have seen; moreover most fail
normality tests. Taking transation osts into aount helps reonile the results obtained on both
samples.
We view these estimates of disaster risk premia as the main empirial ontribution of this paper
beause they are derived within a theoretial framework that allows us to inorporate a variety
of options. We draw two lear onlusions from this experiment. First, disaster risk is pried on
linear ombinations of our original moments. As a result, the minimization does not imply that X
e
= 
D
+ 
G
. The
J-statisti is equal to g
T
var(g
T
)
 1
g
T
 
2
(#moments  #parameters); f Cohrane (2005).
27
Table 13 presents disaster risk premia for the nine developed ountries. Table 14 reports average urreny exess
returns aross portfolios when we sort developed and emerging ountries based on interest rates. Table 15 presents
implied volatilities and risk reversals for developed and emerging ountries. Table 16 reports estimates of disaster risk
premia in the same sample.
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urreny markets. Seond, there are signiant dierenes in the amounts of disaster risk aross
ountries. If all ountries bore the same amount of disaster risk, then it would anel out in our
long{short exess returns.
The estimate of disaster risk premia 
D
is higher when using at-the-money options than out-of-
the-money options. In light of the model, out-of-the-money options seem \too heap" ompared to
at-the-money options. Note, however, that dierenes in disaster risk premia aross these options
are not statistially signiant. Take for example the GMM estimate as a benhmark. Then the
other estimates, obtained using simple averages, dier by 0:15, 0:62, 2:09, and 0:95 perentage
points (see Table 4). But the orresponding standard errors on these dierenes are 0:57, 0:96,
1:72, and 1:01 perentage points. Therefore, the estimates of disaster premia are not statistially
dierent aross strikes. With this aveat in mind, we turn to potential explanations for these
dierent point estimates. We see three possible explanations: illiquidity, ounterparty risk, and
model misspeiation.
The illiquidity explanation runs as follows. The JP Morgan market maker simply gives indiative
pries by using the Blak{Sholes formula (whih generates a low option prie), but there is little
trading of out-of-the-money options. If someone wanted to aggressively buy these options, then
she would end up moving pries against herself and paying higher pries. So the potential trading
pries are higher than the indiative pries we have in our data.
In the ounterparty risk explanation, the seller of a put might atually default during a disaster.
Put premia take that risk into aount and are lower than in the model. This issue, of ourse,
aets not only urreny options but also stok options, redit default swaps, and the like. We
expand on this issue in Setion 3.4.
Finally, the model may simply be misspeied. The model might generate too small a risk-neutral
probability for small depreiations. One way to inorporate this possibility in our model would be to
allow for two kinds of disasters: large disasters and small disasters. In suh a speiation, out-of-
the-money options oer no protetion against small disasters and would therefore be heaper than
at-the-money options.
We do not attempt to enrih the model to apture liquidity and ounterparty risks or small
disasters, leaving this for future researh. In this paper, we fous on the simplest model that is
not rejeted by the data. We an formally test if the model is rejeted with our GMM estimation.
Following Hansen (1982), we ompute the J-test of the model's priing errors. This statisti is
distributed as a hi-square with two degrees of freedom. The J-statisti is 2:51, leading to a p-value
of 0:28. The model is thus not rejeted in our sample.
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3.3 Transation Costs
So far, our estimates of disaster risk premia do not take into aount bid{ask spreads on urreny
markets. Transation osts on forward and spot ontrats would redue unhedged exess returns.
Transation osts on urreny options would inrease insurane osts against disasters. As a result,
these osts would inrease the share of disaster risk premia. In this respet, the numbers previously
reported in this paper onstitute a lower bound.
Bid and ask spreads are not available in the JP Morgan dataset. For the spot and forward
markets, we rely on Reuters daily quotes available on Datastream. Measured in our sample, these
quotes imply average spreads (divided by the mid rate) of 9 basis points for forwards and 8 basis
points for spot rates. When implementing arry trades through forward markets, investors who go
long on high{interest rate urrenies buy forward ontrats at the ask prie. When they reeive the
orresponding foreign urrenies at the end of the ontrat, they onvert their proeeds bak into
U.S. dollars at the bid prie. As a result, they inur half the bid{ask spread on both the forward
and spot ontrats. Assuming a spread of 8 basis points and 12 trades per year, the annual ost
is equal to about 100 basis points or 1%. Gilmore and Hayashi (2008) argue that suh spreads
overstate transation osts on urreny markets beause investors might roll over their positions
eah month instead of losing them to re-open them the next day. With an example based on the
South Afrian rand, they show that forward markets imply an annual arry ost of 192 basis points
whereas rolling over positions would ost only 13 basis points i.e., 15 times less; f. Appendix 2 of
their paper. This estimate, however, assumes that a given urreny remains in the arry portfolio
for ve years, and thus it underestimates the osts due to portfolio rebalaning. As a result, we
assume that the average atual transation osts on our unhedged arry portfolio are in between
these two estimates. We take an annual value of 0.25% for advaned ountries and 2% for emerging
ountries.
We should like to assess transation osts on urreny option markets but unfortunately we
do not have aess to time{series of bid{ask spreads on these markets. To obtain an order of
magnitude, we olleted bid{ask spreads on November 10, 2008 and January 20, 2009 for dierent
urreny pairs.
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Table 12 in Appendix C presents these bid{ask spreads on urreny options quoted
in terms of implied volatilities. Beause of the global nanial risis, implied volatilities are muh
higher than in the rest of our sample. For most urreny pairs, implied volatilities in November
2008 are more than twie their sample means. Aording to market partiipants, bid{ask spreads
in November 2008 were also muh higher than in our sample. These spreads reahed 30% of the
underlying midpoint (mean of bid and ask) values for out-of-the-money options on emerging market
urrenies. Bid{ask spreads are muh tighter for the urrenies of the most advaned ountries.
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We thank the Bank of Frane for sharing these data with us.
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In January 2009, most implied volatilities were lower but spreads remained around 10%. Aording
to market partiipants, these spreads are abnormally large. To estimate the impat of transation
osts on our results, we assume bid{ask spreads of 5% for advaned ountries and 10% for the
others. As a result, spreads widen when implied volatilities inrease, but not fully to the levels
observed during fall 2008. We onvert these implied volatilities spreads into bid{ask pries and then
re-estimate hedged exess returns.
We test the robustness of our results to the inlusion of these transation osts. As expeted,
transation osts inrease the share of disaster risk; the results are reported in Table 6. Using simple
averages, Gaussian risk premia now range from 1.6% to 4.7%. Disaster risk premia also range from
1.6% to 4.7% annually, aounting for approximately 25%{70% of the average arry trade in our
sample. Disaster risk premia are signiantly dierent from zero. Using GMM, we obtain a disaster
risk premium of 1.3% It is three standard errors away from zero and represents one fourth of the
arry trade exess returns. We onsider this value as our best estimate of the ompensation for
disaster risk onsidering the data available. It is, however, a lower bound beause it does not take
into aount default probabilities on option markets.
3.4 Counterparty Risk
So far we have assumed that there is no ounterparty risk for options. However, it is reasonable
to think that the seller of a put might default with some probability  if a disaster ours. In that
ase, an agent engaging in hedged arry trade still bears some disaster risk. Indeed, the expeted
exess return of the hedged arry trade is then:
X
e
hedged
= (1 + )
G
+ 
D
:
Sine with probability  the agent is exposed to disasters, the ompensation for the disaster risk
is then 
D
. Our estimation proedure to unover disaster risk premia must now be amended as
follows:

D
=
X
e
  X
e
()=(1 + 

)
1  =(1 + 

)
: (10)
For instane, take the ase of deep-out-of-the-money options ( =  0:1). Equation (10) shows
that the estimate of 
D
that does not take into aount ounterparty risk must now be multiplied
by approximately 1=(1   1:1). When  = 0:1, 
D
is multiplied by 1.12; when  = 0:25, it is
multiplied by 1.38. For ATM options ( =  0:5) the adjustment is even larger: when  = 0:1, 
D
is multiplied by 1.25; when  = 0:25, it is multiplied by 2.
This setion demonstrates that ounterparty risk an substantially inrease our estimate of
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disaster risk premia. However, we lak data to pin down default probabilities on option markets.
As a result, our estimate of disaster risk premia should be onsidered as a lower bound. One
approah to estimate default probabilities ould be to use information from the redit default swap
or orporate bond markets, but this is beyond the sope of this paper and we leave it for further
researh. Instead, we now ompare our estimate of disaster risk premia to the maroeonomi
literature on disasters, starting with a ase study of fall 2008.
3.5 Fall 2008 and Comparison with Barro and Ursua (2008)
We view this reent period as the unique example of disaster in our data. As noted earlier, its
inlusion in our sample is enough to rejet the normality assumption for many ountries. In this
setion, we provide a brief desription of what happened in urreny markets. Both spot and option
markets support the haraterization of this period as a nanial disaster.
Fall 2008. In our sample, fall 2008 stands out as the worst time for arry traders. This is obvious
for spei urrenies, but it also holds for urreny portfolio returns. We start with a simple
example using two bilateral exhange rates; in the reent period, the New Zealand dollar has been
a high{interest rate urreny while the Japanese yen has been a low{interest rate one. Figure 4
plots monthly hanges in these exhange rates against the U.S. dollar. We start our graph at the
beginning of the subprime risis on nanial markets; the sample period is thus 7/2007 { 12/2008.
Clearly, the Japanese yen appreiated and the New Zealand dollar depreiated during that period,
with both movements hurting arry traders. The same gure also reports the return index on a
arry trade strategy that borrows in yen to invest in the New Zealand dollar. The index starts at
100 in July 2007. At the end of Deember 2008, the index is slightly above 60, and most of the
losses have ourred in the last four months of the sample. These losses are not spei to the
New Zealand dollar{Japanese yen pair; we obtain similar results with our baskets of urrenies.
The average return of our arry trade strategy was minus 4.5% in the fall 2008, for a umulative
deline from September to Deember that amounts to 17.8%. This is a large drop, as the standard
deviation of monthly returns over the whole sample is just 2%. Almost all of the 17.8% deline is
due to losses on high{interest rate urrenies, whih depreiated sharply.
Similar onlusions arise in the ase of urreny options. Large hanges in exhange rates
triggered exerise of urreny options embedded in our portfolios. Figure 5 plots the frequeny of
all and put options exerised on urrenies alloated in the rst and last portfolios, respetively.
At eah moment in time, the frequeny is obtained as the number of options exerised divided by
the number of urrenies in the portfolio at that time. Reall that the rst portfolio ontains low{
interest rate urrenies and thus funding urrenies. Investors want to buy all options to insure
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themselves against large appreiation of suh urrenies. The last portfolio ontains high{interest
rate urrenies. There, investors onsider put options. The gure shows learly that the frequeny
of 10-delta put options exerised reahes an all-time high in the fall of 2008. The proportion of all
options triggered was also high, but not at its maximum value in the sample.
These very low returns on urreny markets ourred in bad times for U.S. investors. During
fall 2008, the U.S. stok market delined by 33% in terms of the MSCI index.
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Figure 6 ompares
equity and urreny exess returns over our sample. The orrelation between these exess returns
is partiularly high, reahing 0.7 sine the start of the subprime mortgage risis in July 2007.
Standard risk measures beyond those from equity markets point in the same diretion in our
sample: the equity option{implied volatility index VIX, its bond equivalent MOVE, and redit spreads
were at their all-time high in the fall of 2008. Figure 7 presents all these variables in a standardized
way: urreny returns and risk measures are all de-meaned and then divided by their standard
deviations. The events of fall 2008 represent up to ve standard deviations in these series. Very
low urreny exess returns (four standard deviations below their means) happened exatly when
volatilities in equity and bond markets and redit spreads were high (four standard deviations above
their means) | that is, in bad times. Our sample in this paper is short, but our ndings are in line
with the literature. As Lustig et al. (2008) show, arry trades tend to pay poorly during times of
rises, exatly when stok markets tank. This high orrelation between stok and urreny markets
also ourred during the 1987 stok market rash and during the Mexian, Asian, and Russian
rises. These market-based indies oer real-time measures of risk that omplement the approah
based on marginal utilities and real onsumption growth rates. Figure 8 fouses on onsumption
growth, and the same onlusion emerges here. Preliminary estimates of U.S. national aount
statistis point toward an annualized derease of 4.3% in real personal onsumption expenditures
in the fourth quarter of 2008, following an annualized derease of 3.8% in the third quarter. These
shoks represent delines of more than three standard deviations in the mean onsumption growth
rate. As reported in Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) on an earlier sample, low arry trade exess
returns tend to our in times of low onsumption growth.
Finally, note that the link between risk reversals and subsequent urreny appreiations dier
during risis and normal times. In normal times, aording to the model, high levels of risk reversals
should predit foreign urreny appreiations. Using atual data, however, we did not nd muh
signiant preditability though. During times of risis, high risk reversals should predit foreign
urreny depreiation. This is what happened during the fall of 2008: foreign urreny depreiation
seemed to follow high risk reversals. This behavior is line with the model if we interpret the fall of
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The losest event to this very strong deline in equity and urreny returns is the 1987 stok market rash. From
September to November 1987, the U.S. stok market lost 32.6%. This period is not in our sample beause we do not
have urreny option data before January 1996.
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2008 as a disaster. The evidene is, of ourse, very limited beause we have only one disaster in our
sample. As a onsequene, we do not attempt to quantify this point and instead simply present, in
Figure 9, exhange rate appreiations and risk reversals for eah month and eah urreny in the
fall of 2008.
Aording to many markets and risk fators, the fall of 2008 onstitutes a disaster. We use this
example to onnet our ndings with the previous maroeonomi literature on disasters.
Comparison with Barro and Ursua (2008). In a disaster, the stohasti disount fator is mul-
tiplied by an amount J. To relate this J to more primitive eonomi quantities, we use the model of
Farhi and Gabaix (2008). In that model, J = B
 
F where B
 
is the growth of real marginal utility
during a disaster and F is the growth of the value of one unit of the loal urreny in terms of interna-
tional goods during the same disaster. Hene 
D
= pE[J℄
1
 pE[J℄
3
= pE[B
 
(F )℄
1
 pE[B
 
(F )℄
3
.
Therefore, the disaster risk premium depends on the probability of disasters p, the relative value
of the SDF B
 
, and the payo of the arry trade in disasters through the suÆient statisti
pE[B
 
(F )℄
1
  pE[B
 
(F )℄
3
. Using the episode of fall 2008 to alibrate the value of F
1
  F
3
and assuming away a potential orrelation between B
 
and F
1
  F
3
, we an shed some light on
the typial value of pB
 
. This exerise should be viewed as a bak-of-the-envelope alulation
rather than a rigorous estimate, sine our inferene of F
1
  F
3
relies on a single disaster that is
still unfolding as this paper is written. Thus we annot observe the full path to reovery and, as
Gourio (2008) shows, we might overestimate the impat of disasters. With this aveat in mind, if
we retain a value for F
1
  F
3
of 20% then a value for pE[B
 
℄ of 6:5% is neessary to generate a
disaster risk premium 
D
of the order of magnitude that we estimate in the data.
We ompare this value to Barro and Ursua's (2008b) estimates. These authors use long samples
of onsumption series for a large set of ountries.
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Their ndings are broadly onsistent with the
estimates from Barro (2006), whih are based on GDP disasters. Barro and Ursua (2008b) estimate
a probability of disasters p equal to 3:63%. A oeÆient of relative risk aversion  = 3:5 then
implies that E[B
 
℄ = 3:88, leading to a value of pE[B
 
℄ equal to 14%. The authors show that
these values an rationalize the equity premium.
Using a value of 14% for pE[B
 
℄ and a value of 20% for F
1
 F
3
leads to a disaster risk premium
of 0:14  0:2 = 2:8%, whih is higher than but still omparable to our point estimate. Therefore,
we view our estimates as being broadly onsistent with Barro and Ursua (2008b)'s ndings. We
end this paper with a review of the link between volatility smiles, risk reversals, and exhange rates.
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Note, however, that interpreting our priing kernel stritly as a simple funtion of onsumption growth would open
a large debate that is beyond the sope of this paper. Constant relative risk aversion and omplete markets imply, for
example, a very high orrelation between onsumption growth and exhange rates, a high orrelation that is not evident
in the data (Bakus and Smith, 1993).
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3.6 Volatility Smiles, Risk Reversals, and Exhange Rates
We rst provide a simple alibration of the model in order to hek that it simultaneously aounts
for the volatility smile observed in the data and the disaster risk premium that we have estimated.
We then test the ontemporaneous relationship between risk reversals and exhange rates, and the
preditive ontent of risk reversals for urrenies.
Aounting for the smile. In this setion we examine the impliations of our model for the
volatility smile { that is, the relationship between the implied volatility and the strike of urreny
options. The exat value of a put with strike K is given by
P
t;t+
(K) = (1  p) e
 g


V
P
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 (g g
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)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=
√
var ("  "

) and the expetation operator E is over the joint distribution of J
and J

:
The implied volatility ̂
t;t+
is omputed by solving the following impliit equation:
P
t;t+
(K) = e
 r


V
P
BS
(
1; Ke
 (r r

)
; ̂
t;t+
p

)
;
where r = g   log (1 + pE [J   1℄) = and r

= g
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 . Reall that when
quoting options, traders routinely use the delta of the underlying option rather than its strike, whih
is a onventional quantity omputed as
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:
Note that this quantity might dier from the true sensitivity of the option with respet to the
fundamental.
All our urreny options are options on exhange rates against the U.S dollar. It is therefore
most natural to attempt to alibrate our model to t the average volatility smile of a given portfolio.
We hoose to fous on portfolio 3 whih represents a arry trade where the funding urreny is the
U.S. dollar. To alibrate the model, we hoose the parameters as follows. We take J and J

to
be deterministi. We assume that the values of p and J for the United States are onsistent with
the estimation of Barro and Ursua: J = B
 
= 3:88 and p = 3:63%. We hoose J

to math a
value of 
D
= 1:6%, a number that is roughly in the middle of our range of estimates. We shall
investigate the sensitivity of the alibration to the exat value retained for 
D
, whih implies that
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J
= J
(
1  
D
= (pB
 
)
)
= 3:44. We hoose the physial volatility of the exhange rate to math
an implied volatility at the money in portfolio 3 of 10%. This leads us to pik 
t;t+
= 9:6%. We
pik g = 13:4 and g

= 14:6% in order to math the average U.S. interest rate (r = 3%) and the
average interest rate in portfolio 3 (r

= 5:8%) over the sample.
The resulting implied volatilities as a funtion of the delta of the option in this alibration are as
follows. For a 10-delta put, the implied volatility is 11:4%. For a 25-delta put, the implied volatility
is 10:4%. At the money, the implied volatility is 10:0%. For a 25-delta all, the implied volatility is
9:9%. Finally, for a 10-delta all, the implied volatility is 9:8%.
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These values should be ompared with the implied volatilities for portfolio 3 in the data. For
a 10-delta put, the implied volatility is 11:5%. For a 25-delta put, the implied volatility is 10:6%.
At the money, the implied volatility is 10:0%. For a 25-delta all, the implied volatility is 10:0%.
Finally, for a 10-delta all, the implied volatility is 10:4%. The overall t of our model is quite good.
It is better for out-of-the-money puts than for out-of-the-money alls. Note, however, that we
obtain these values by assuming onstant J and J
?
. The t ould be further improved by hoosing
an appropriate probability distribution for J and J

.
Risk reversals and exhange rates. The model implies that (i) inreases in risk reversals are
assoiated with ontemporaneous exhange rate depreiations, and (ii) high levels of risk reversals
predit future urreny returns. We test these preditions both on panel data and on portfolio
series.
In order to test for the rst predition, we rst regress monthly hanges in nominal exhange
rates on monthly hanges in risk reversals. We use risk reversals measured in pries at 10 and 25
deltas. Beause these deltas imply dierent deviations from forward rates aross ountries, we also
hek our ndings on risk reversals that are normalized: these risk reversals orrespond to strikes
that are 5% or 10% away from forward rates. We de-mean both the regressor and the dependant
variable so as to remove the entral role played by the U.S. dollar. The results on portfolios are
reported in Table 7. Tables 18 and 19 in Appendix C report panel results for advaned eonomies and
the whole sample, respetively. All panel speiations inlude urreny xed eets, and standard
errors are obtained by bootstrap. We nd a highly robust negative orrelation between hanges
in risk reversals and hanges in exhange rates. This negative relationship is robust to alternative
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Following the same alibration proedure but using a value of 2% for 
D
leads to the following implied volatilities.
For a 10-delta put, the implied volatility is 12:1%. For a 25-delta put, the implied volatility is 10:6%. At the money,
the implied volatility is 10:0%. For a 25-delta all, the implied volatility is 9:9%. Finally, for a 10-delta all, the implied
volatility is 9:8%. We also report the implied volatilities when the retained value for 
D
is 1%. For a 10-delta put, the
implied volatility is 10:5%. For a 25-delta put, the implied volatility is 10:2%. At the money, the implied volatility is
10:0%. For a 25-delta all, the implied volatility is 10:0%. Finally, for a 10-delta all, the implied volatility is 9:9%.
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risk-reversal measures and to ontrolling for the eet of the dollar.
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With portfolios and risk
reversals at either 10 or 25 deltas, R
2
values range from 25% to 40%. In our panel estimates using
demeaned ountry-level exhange rates, R
2
values are lose to 5%. In both ases, risk reversals
are statistially signiant. Their eet is also eonomially signiant: a one-standard-deviation
hange in risk reversals is assoiated with a 1% to 2:3% variation in exhange rates, whih is slightly
below the monthly standard deviation of nominal exhange rate hanges (2:8%).
In order to test for the seond predition, we augment standard UIP regressions with risk
reversals. Equivalent regressions are run against exess returns instead of hanges in exhange
rates. The null hypothesis of UIP is a oeÆient of 1 for the interest dierential (dened as
the dierene between domesti and foreign interest rate in the speiation with exhange rate
hange) and a oeÆient of 0 in the speiation with exess returns. We reover the usual negative
oeÆient on the interest rate dierential. Adding risk reversals to the usual UIP regressions does
not improve one-month-ahead exhange rate foreasts, and no risk reversal signiantly predits
urreny exess returns or hanges in nominal exhange rates in panel data, as shown in Table 8.
To save spae, we report equivalent panel results in Tables 20 and 21 in Appendix C. Curreny
portfolios suggest a lear positive relationship between average urreny exess returns and average
risk reversals aross portfolios. As previously noted, the last panel of Table 2 reports an inrease in
average risk reversals from the rst to the last portfolio. Equivalent results are obtained for other
measures of risk reversals and for the whole sample of advaned and emerging ountries. However,
within portfolios, there is no one-month-ahead preditability of risk reversals on urreny exess
returns; this is shown in Table 8.
Overall we nd strong evidene in favor of a ontemporaneous link between exhange rates and
risk reversals, but we nd more limited evidene of exhange rate preditability.
4 Conlusion
The objetive of this paper is to provide a simple model-based estimation of the share of arry
trade returns that an be attributed to disaster risk. Our main empirial result shows that disaster
premia explain one fourth of arry trade returns. This result suggests that the introdution of a
time-varying disaster risk in exhange rate models, as in Farhi and Gabaix (2008), is empirially
relevant.
Although we nd that disaster risk plays a signiant role in explaining urreny returns, we fall
short of fully solving the arry trade puzzle though disasters. In fat, our ndings suggest that
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Carr and Wu (2007) also report high ontemporaneous orrelation between urreny exess returns and risk reversals
for the yen and the British pound against the U.S. dollar.
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a typial investor an still obtain signiant arry trade returns while being hedged against large
urreny rashes. Several interpretations of these hedged exess returns are possible. First, the
investor naturally expets to be ompensated for the remaining Gaussian, non{disaster risk. In
bad times high{interest rate urrenies tend to depreiate and low{interest rate urrenies tend
to appreiate. Seond, out-of-the-money options might be relatively heap in our sample. These
options are not default-free, and ounterparty risk might push their pries downward.
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Table 1: Exess Returns: Advaned Countries Sorted on Interest Rates
Portfolios 1 2 3 1 2 3
Going Long Going Short
Panel I: Unhedged
Mean  1:37 1:45 5:13 1:37  1:45  5:13
[2:08℄ [2:25℄ [2:08℄ [2:02℄ [2:14℄ [1:99℄
Sharpe Ratio  0:19 0:19 0:71 0:19  0:19  0:71
Panel II: Hedged at 10 delta
Mean  2:30 0:65 4:06 0:74  1:58  5:33
[1:93℄ [1:99℄ [1:90℄ [1:86℄ [1:94℄ [1:87℄
Sharpe Ratio  0:33 0:09 0:60 0:11  0:23  0:81
Panel III: Hedged at 25 delta
Mean  2:14 0:59 3:03 0:62  1:21  4:68
[1:72℄ [1:82℄ [1:66℄ [1:48℄ [1:59℄ [1:53℄
Sharpe Ratio  0:36 0:09 0:51 0:12  0:21  0:86
Panel IV: Hedged ATM
Mean  1:33 0:61 1:68 0:02  0:86  3:47
[1:27℄ [1:40℄ [1:26℄ [1:07℄ [1:13℄ [1:10℄
Sharpe Ratio  0:31 0:13 0:39 0:00  0:21  0:91
Notes: This table reports average urreny exess returns that are unhedged or hedged at 10 delta, at 25 delta, and
at-the-money for our three portfolios. In the left setion, we assume that the U.S. investor goes long in the foreign
urreny; in the right setion, we assume that the U.S. investor goes short in the foreign urreny. In eah ase,
we report the mean exess return, its standard error, and the orresponding Sharpe ratio. The mean and standard
deviations are annualized (multiplied respetively by 12 and
p
12). The Sharpe ratio orresponds to the ratio of the
annualized mean to the annualized standard deviation. Standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping the monthly
exess returns under the assumptions that they are i.i.d. Portfolio 1 ontains urrenies with the lowest interest rates;
portfolio 3 ontains urrenies with the highest interest rates. The horizon of the exess returns and the option maturity
is one month for eah. Data are monthly, from JP Morgan. The sample period is 1/1996 { 8/2008.
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Table 2: Implied Volatilities and Risk Reversals: Advaned Countries Sorted on Interest Rates
Portfolios 1 2 3
Panel I: Implied Volatilities
10Æ Put 9:78 10:09 11:50
[0:14℄ [0:17℄ [0:20℄
25Æ Put 9:38 9:56 10:60
[0:15℄ [0:16℄ [0:17℄
ATM 9:33 9:31 10:02
[0:14℄ [0:16℄ [0:17℄
25Æ Call 9:78 9:55 10:02
[0:15℄ [0:16℄ [0:15℄
10Æ Call 10:51 10:05 10:39
[0:16℄ [0:17℄ [0:16℄
Panel II: Risk Reversals (Implied Volatilities)
Mean RR10  0:73 0:05 1:12
[0:06℄ [0:05℄ [0:06℄
Mean RR25  0:40 0:01 0:58
[0:03℄ [0:03℄ [0:03℄
Notes: This table reports average implied volatilities and risk reversals by portfolios. The rst panel reports average
implied volatilities on put and all ontrats for strike pries at 10 delta, at 25 delta, and at-the-money. The seond
panel reports risk reversals at 10 delta and 25 delta measured in terms of implied volatilities. The gures are quoted in
annual perentages. Standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping the monthly exess returns under the assumptions
that they are i.i.d. Portfolio 1 ontains urrenies with the lowest interest rates; portfolio 3 ontains urrenies with
the highest interest rates. The horizon of the exess returns and the option maturity is one month for eah. Data are
monthly, from JP Morgan. The sample period is 1/1996 { 8/2008.
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Table 3: Exess Returns: Advaned Countries Sorted on Risk Reversals
Portfolios 1 2 3 1 2 3
Going Long Going Short
Panel I: Unhedged
Mean 0:48 1:22 3:70  0:48  1:22  3:70
[2:10℄ [2:11℄ [1:95℄ [2:06℄ [2:05℄ [1:87℄
Sharpe Ratio 0:06 0:16 0:54  0:06  0:16  0:54
Panel II: Hedged at 10 delta
Mean  0:38 0:47 2:57  1:00  1:39  3:96
[2:02℄ [2:05℄ [1:83℄ [1:98℄ [1:90℄ [1:76℄
Sharpe Ratio  0:05 0:07 0:39  0:14  0:20  0:62
Panel III: Hedged at 25 delta
Mean  0:21 0:05 1:83  0:68  1:29  3:45
[1:68℄ [1:70℄ [1:51℄ [1:66℄ [1:61℄ [1:45℄
Sharpe Ratio  0:03 0:01 0:33  0:12  0:23  0:65
Panel IV: Hedged ATM
Mean  0:03  0:09 1:17  0:53  1:33  2:55
[1:28℄ [1:31℄ [1:10℄ [1:12℄ [1:16℄ [1:06℄
Sharpe Ratio  0:01  0:02 0:29  0:13  0:32  0:69
Notes: This table reports average urreny exess returns that are unhedged or hedged at 10 delta, at 25 delta, and
at the money for our three portfolios. In the left setion, we assume that the U.S. investor goes long in the foreign
urreny; in the right setion, we assume that the U.S. investor goes short in the foreign urreny. In eah ase,
we report the mean exess return, its standard error, and the orresponding Sharpe ratio. The mean and standard
deviations are annualized (multiplied respetively by 12 and
p
12). The Sharpe ratio orresponds to the ratio of the
annualized mean to the annualized standard deviation. Standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping the monthly
exess returns under the assumptions that they are i.i.d. Portfolio 1 ontains urrenies with the lowest risk reversals
at 10 delta; portfolio 3 ontains urrenies with the highest risk reversals at 10 delta. The horizon of the exess returns
and the option maturity is one month for eah. Data are monthly, from JP Morgan. The sample period is 1/1996 {
8/2008.
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Table 4: Disaster Risk Premia - Advaned Countries Sorted on Interest Rates
Panel I: Carry Exess Returns
Unhedged Carry Hedged at 10Æ Hedged at 25Æ Hedged ATM
Mean 6:50 4:80 3:65 1:70
[1:88℄ [1:59℄ [1:41℄ [1:12℄
Mean Spread 1:70 2:85 4:80
[0:41℄ [0:85℄ [1:32℄
Panel II: Estimations
10Æ 25Æ ATM 10Æ; 25Æ, GMM
and ATM 2
nd
Stage

D
1:16 1:63 3:10 1:96 1:01
[0:41℄ [0:87℄ [1:68℄ [0:93℄ [0:36℄

G
5:33 4:87 3:40 4:53 4:77
[1:79℄ [1:87℄ [2:21℄ [1:87℄ [1:92℄

D
  
G
 4:17  3:23  0:30  2:57  3:76
[1:90℄ [2:31℄ [3:51℄ [2:35℄ [2:02℄
Notes: This rst panel of this table reports average returns on hedged and unhedged urreny arry trades and their
standard errors. We use the urreny portfolios presented in Table 1. Carry trades orrespond to returns on the last
minus returns on the rst portfolio. We onsider dierent hedges: 10-delta, 25-delta and at-the-money. We also report
the average dierene between unhedged and hedged arry trades. The seond panel reports strutural estimates. Here

D
denotes the part of the arry exess return linked to disaster risk and 
G
orresponds to the Gaussian, non-disaster
part of the same exess return. These estimates are obtained using hedged returns at 10 delta (rst olumn), 25 delta
(seond olumn), and ATM (third olumn) or at 10 delta, at 25 delta, and ATM ombined (fourth and fth olumns).
Standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping the monthly exess returns under the assumptions that they are i.i.d.
Data are monthly, from JP Morgan. The sample period is 1/1996 { 8/2008.
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Table 5: Disaster Risk Premia : Advaned Countries Sorted on Risk Reversals
Panel I: Carry Exess Returns
Unhedged Carry Hedged at 10Æ Hedged at 25Æ Hedged ATM
Mean 3:22 1:57 1:15 0:64
[1:66℄ [1:53℄ [1:29℄ [1:14℄
Mean Spread 1:65 2:07 2:58
[0:36℄ [0:80℄ [1:32℄
Panel II: Estimations
10Æ 25Æ ATM 10Æ; 25Æ, GMM
and ATM 2
nd
Stage

D
1:48 1:68 1:94 1:70 1:41
[0:36℄ [0:87℄ [1:72℄ [0:94℄ [0:32℄

G
1:74 1:54 1:28 1:52 1:67
[1:67℄ [1:74℄ [2:11℄ [1:74℄ [1:78℄

D
  
G
 0:26 0:14 0:66 0:18  0:27
[1:79℄ [2:22℄ [3:49℄ [2:28℄ [1:90℄
Notes: This rst panel of this table reports average returns on hedged and unhedged urreny arry trades and their
standard errors. We use the urreny portfolios presented in Table 3. Carry trades orrespond to returns on the last
minus returns on the rst portfolio. We onsider dierent hedges: 10-delta, 25-delta and at-the-money. We also report
the average dierene between unhedged and hedged arry trades. The seond panel reports strutural estimates. Here

D
denotes the part of the arry exess return linked to disaster risk and 
G
orresponds to the Gaussian, non-disaster
part of the same exess return. These estimates are obtained using hedged returns at 10 delta (rst olumn), 25 delta
(seond olumn), and ATM(third olumn) or at 10 delta, at 25 delta and ATM ombined (fourth and fth olumns).
Standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping the monthly exess returns under the assumptions that they are i.i.d.
Data are monthly, from JP Morgan. The sample period is 1/1996 { 8/2008.
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Table 6: Disaster Risk Premia - Advaned Countries Sorted on Interest Rates with Transation
Costs
Panel I: Carry Exess Returns
Unhedged Carry Hedged at 10Æ Hedged at 25Æ Hedged ATM
Mean 6:25 4:21 2:83 0:78
[1:83℄ [1:67℄ [1:44℄ [1:14℄
Mean Spread 2:04 3:42 5:47
[0:43℄ [0:85℄ [1:34℄
Panel II: Estimations
10Æ 25Æ ATM 10Æ; 25Æ, GMM
and ATM 2
nd
Stage

D
1:57 2:47 4:69 2:91 1:28
[0:41℄ [0:87℄ [1:68℄ [0:93℄ [0:37℄

G
4:67 3:78 1:56 3:34 4:02
[1:81℄ [1:91℄ [2:29℄ [1:91℄ [1:96℄

D
  
G
 3:10  1:31 3:14  0:42 -2.74
[1:91℄ [2:35℄ [3:60℄ [2:41℄ [2.04℄
Notes: This rst panel of this table reports average returns on hedged and unhedged urreny arry trades and their
standard errors. We use the urreny portfolios presented in Table 1. Carry trades orrespond to returns on the last
minus returns on the rst portfolio. We onsider dierent hedges: 10-delta, 25-delta and at-the-money. We also report
the average dierene between unhedged and hedged arry trades. The seond panel reports strutural estimates. Here

D
denotes the part of the arry exess return linked to disaster risk and 
G
orresponds to the Gaussian, non-disaster
part of the same exess return. These estimates are obtained using hedged returns at 10 delta (rst olumn), 25 delta
(seond olumn), and ATM (third olumn) or at 10 delta, at 25 delta, and ATM ombined (fourth and fth olumns).
Standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping the monthly exess returns under the assumptions that they are i.i.d.
Data are monthly, from JP Morgan. The sample period is 1/1996 { 8/2008. We assume annual transation osts of
0:25% on unhedged returns and bid{ask spreads of 5% on implied volatilities.
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Table 7: Changes in Risk Reversals and Exhange Rates: Contemporaneous Speiations within
Portfolios
Dependant Variable: Exhange Rates
Panel I: Raw Variables Panel II: De-meaned Variables
Portfolios P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3
Risk Reversals -126.63 -131.82 -105.18 -119.95 -132.09 -145.43
Strike: Delta 10 [12.93℄*** [24.22℄*** [28.46℄*** [27.30℄*** [18.09℄*** [17.87℄***
Observations 155 155 155 155 155 155
R
2
0.4 0.28 0.41 0.37 0.42 0.35
Risk Reversals -77.56 -62.66 -49.29 -54.95 -62 -74.57
Strike: Delta 25 [8.46℄*** [18.28℄*** [16.76℄*** [19.08℄*** [17.25℄*** [14.26℄***
Observations 155 155 155 155 155 155
R
2
0.38 0.25 0.36 0.32 0.36 0.31
Risk Reversals -61.64 -39.38 -30.31 -96.83 -45.76 -69.08
Strike: Forward +/- 10% [14.66℄*** [36.52℄ [13.61℄** [60.45℄ [12.88℄*** [30.00℄**
Observations 96 125 133 96 125 133
R
2
0.22 0.14 0.28 0.05 0.25 0.16
Risk Reversals -40.08 -48.97 -46.8 -50.99 -52.8 -47.9
Strike: Forward +/- 5% [4.69℄*** [6.05℄*** [7.66℄*** [7.51℄*** [5.08℄*** [6.80℄***
Observations 147 155 144 147 155 144
R
2
0.39 0.3 0.46 0.42 0.44 0.32
Notes: This table douments ontemporaneous relationships between hanges in nominal exhange rates and hanges
in risk reversals. Constant terms are inluded but not reported. Panel I presents results based on raw variables; panel
II uses ross-setionally de-meaned variables to ontrol for the spei role of the U.S. dollar. Changes in exhange
rates orrespond to monthly log hanges; hanges in risk reversals orrespond to rst dierenes. Eah horizontal
panel presents the results of regressions inluding a dierent risk-reversal measure. Standard errors obtained from
bootstrap proedures using 1000 repliations are presented below the point estimates. The symbols ***, **, and *
indiate statistial signiane at 1%, 5%, and 10% ondene levels respetively. The sample omprises urrenies
from advaned ountries (exluding observations with non oating exhange rate aording to the IMF de fato
lassiation). Data are monthly, from JP Morgan. The sample period is 02/1996 { 08/2008.
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Table 8: Risk Reversals, Exhange Rate Changes and Curreny Exess Returns: Preditive Spei-
ations within Portfolios
Dependant Variable: Panel I: Exhange Rates Panel II: Curreny Exess Returns
Portfolios P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3
Interest Rate Dierentials -1.27 -4.16 -0.97 -2.27 -5.17 -1.97
[1.52℄ [1.77℄** [1.08℄ [1.49℄ [1.74℄*** [1.06℄*
Risk Reversals: (+/- 10%) 13.1 -1.12 -3.7 13.11 -1.14 -3.72
[13.36℄ [37.33℄ [19.30℄ [14.94℄ [40.95℄ [19.38℄
Observations 109 129 138 109 129 138
R
2
0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.03
Interest Rate Dierentials -2.78 -3.49 -0.96 -3.78 -4.5 -1.97
[1.28℄** [1.72℄** [1.15℄ [1.27℄*** [1.79℄** [1.16℄*
Risk Reversals: (+/- 5%) 0.81 -2.37 -3.44 0.81 -2.39 -3.47
[5.52℄ [9.54℄ [7.53℄ [5.55℄ [9.69℄ [7.26℄
Observations 109 129 138 109 129 138
R
2
0.03 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.02
Interest Rate Dierentials -2.5 - 3.48 -0.7 -3.5 -4.49 -1.71
[1.21℄** [1.71℄** [1.02℄ [1.22℄*** [1.65℄*** [1.06℄
Risk Reversals: Delta 10 4.18 -8.18 -7.39 4.17 -8.23 -7.44
[16.66℄ [25.22℄ [18.81℄ [17.10℄ [26.06℄ [18.55℄
Observations 155 155 155 155 155 155
R
2
0.02 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.02
Interest Rate Dierentials -2.51 -3.49 -0.76 -3.52 -4.5 -1.76
[1.26℄** [1.69℄** [1.07℄ [1.23℄*** [1.68℄*** [1.12℄
Risk Reversals: Delta 25 0.39 -5.32 -5.06 0.38 -5.35 -5.09
[9.31℄ [13.27℄ [10.02℄ [9.41℄ [14.19℄ [10.90℄
Observations 155 155 155 155 155 155
R
2
0.02 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.02
Notes: This table presents results of preditability tests. We regress monthly hanges in nominal exhange rates (panel
I) or monthly urreny exess returns (panel II) on risk reversals and interest dierentials. The interest dierential is
dened as the dierene between the domesti and the foreign interest rate. The null hypothesis of UIP not being
rejeted is a oeÆient of 1 for the interest rate dierential in panel I and a oeÆient of 0 in panel II. Constant
terms are inluded but not reported. Standard errors obtained from a bootstrap proedure using 1000 repliations
are presented below their respetive point estimates. The symbols ***, **, and * indiate statistial signiane at
1%, 5%, and 10% ondene levels respetively. The sample omprises urrenies from advaned ountries (exluding
observations with non oating exhange rate aording to the IMF de fato lassiation.) Data are monthly, from JP
Morgan. The sample period is 02/1996 { 08/2008.
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Prices and Strikes
Long Put (Strike K)
Long Call (Strike K*)
Long Risk Reversal (Long Put with Strike K; Short Call
with Strike K*)
K
0
K*
Figure 1: Option Payos
This gure presents the payos of dierent option investments as a funtion of the underlying asset pries and strikes.
We onsider the payo of buying a all (with strike K
?
) or buying a put option (with strike K). Finally, we onsider a
risk reversal that orresponds to selling a all (with strike K
?
) and simultaneously buying a put (with strike K).
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Figure 2: Deltas
This gure presents the deltas of put options as a funtion of their pries. The delta of an option is dened as the rate
of hange of the option prie with respet to the prie of the underlying asset. The delta of a put varies between 0 for
the most deep-out-of-the-money options and  1 for the most deep-in-the-money options. The gure is omputed for
a urreny put option with a one-month maturity, an annualized implied volatility of 10%, and foreign and domesti
interest rates both set equal to 4% per annum.
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Figure 3: One-Month Option-Implied Volatility Smiles, August 2008
This gure plots, for eah urreny in our sample, implied volatilities for dierent strike pries. Implied volatilities are
in perentages; strike pries are saled by spot rates.
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Figure 4: New Zealand Dollar and Japanese Yen
This gure plots monthly hanges in exhange rates for the New Zealand dollar and the Japanese yen as well the
return index on a arry trade strategy that borrows in yen to invest in New Zealand dollars. The sample period is
7/2007{12/2008.
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Figure 5: Options Exerised
This gure plots the frequeny of all and put options exerised (respetively) in the rst and last portfolios. At eah
moment in time, the frequeny is obtained as the number of options exerised divided by the number of urrenies in
the portfolio at that time. We onsider only options at 10 delta. The sample period is 2/1996 { 12/2008.
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Figure 6: Curreny Carry Trades and Equity Returns
This gure plots monthly urreny arry trades and U.S. equity returns. Carry exess returns (blue bars) orrespond to
our sample of advaned ountries. Data are monthly, from JP Morgan (IMF). Equity returns (red line) orrespond to
the U.S. MSCI index. The sample period is 2/1996 { 12/2008.
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Figure 7: Carry Returns and Risk Measures
This gure plots arry exess returns and dierent risk measures. The upper panel uses the equity option{implied
volatility index VIX; below are the bond option{implied volatility MOVE index and the redit spread (measured as the
yield spreads between BAA bonds and 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds). Curreny returns (blue bars) and risk measures
(red lines) are all de-meaned and then divided by their standard deviations. The sample period is 2/1996{12/2008.
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Figure 8: Carry Returns and Consumption Growth
This gure presents quarterly arry exess returns and real onsumption growth per apita. Curreny returns (blue
bars) and onsumption growth (red line) are all de-meaned and then divided by their standard deviations. The sample
period is 2/1996{12/2008.
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Figure 9: Risk Reversals and Changes in Exhange Rates, Fall 2008
This gure plots risk reversals at 10 delta and subsequent one-month hanges in exhange rates for eah month of
fall 2008. Risk reversal pries are in basis points; hanges in exhange rates are in perentages. Inreases in exhange
rates orrespond to depreiation of the U.S. dollar. Exhange rate hanges between date t and t + 1 are dated t + 1.
The sample fouses on advaned ountries and overs the period from 9/2008 to 12/2008.
57
